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Chapter I.  
Fueling Violence Instead of Education? The Effect of Oil Price Shocks on Educational 
Attainment 
Abstract 
Greater local economic activity could improve the educational attainment of children by 
increasing the resources available to invest in education. However, higher economic 
activity could also result in no gains in children’s education. This paper studies the role 
of violence in explaining this paradox, with a focus on Colombia, an oil producing 
country with a long-standing civil conflict. Existing evidence shows that oil price shocks 
fuel civil conflicts. This paper explores whether this increased violence undermines any 
positive effect higher oil resources might have on educational attainment. To assess how 
oil price shocks affect educational outcomes, this paper exploits exogenous increases in 
international oil prices and geographic variation in oil production. The estimates suggest 
that the rise in oil prices between 1998 and 2005 had a limited effect on the number of 
years of schooling, and whether children are behind grade for their age. Moreover, oil 
price shocks had small but surprising negative effects on primary school enrollment. My 
analysis reveals that these results might be driven by the investment of additional oil 
resources in social sectors other than education, and by oil price shocks fueling civil 
conflicts. In Colombia, instead of improving education, higher oil revenues encouraged 
illegal right wing paramilitary groups to steal oil resources, resulting in an 8% increase 
in paramilitary violence in oil municipalities. 
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1. Introduction 
Does higher economic activity result in better educational outcomes for children? As 
suggested by growing evidence in developing and developed countries, the answer is “not 
necessarily.” In the literature, child labor is the primary explanation for this paradox: 
higher economic activity may increase the wages of low-skilled workers, which in turn 
increases the opportunity cost of studying and leads children into employment rather 
than education (Cascio and Narayan, 2015; Santos, 2014; Kruger, 2007; Black, 
McKinnish and Sanders, 2005; Duryea and Arends-Kuenning, 2003). 
This paper explores another potential mechanism behind this paradox. The mechanism 
is violence during oil price shocks that occur in the middle of civil conflicts, which 
operates even in contexts where higher economic activity does not have large effects on 
low-skilled labor. In this paper, I show that a rise in international oil prices brought 
more public revenue to Colombia, an oil producing country that has suffered from a 
long-standing civil conflict. The rise in oil revenue did not improve educational outcomes 
for children, because the additional resources were not invested in education. Instead, 
the rise in international oil prices fueled the civil conflict, which in turn could have 
negatively affected education.  
Oil price shocks fueled the civil conflict in Colombia because higher oil rents incentivized 
the violent appropriation of oil resources by non-state armed forces, as explained by 
Dube and Vargas (2013). In the resource curse literature, the positive effect of higher 
mining rents on violence has been previously found in several contexts. The resource 
curse broadly refers to countries rich in non-renewable natural resources that yet display 
poor economic performance.  Conflict plays a prominent role among the several 1
proposed explanations for this paradox (World Bank, 2011). Recent studies in the 
resource curse literature exploit within-country variations, and have identified positive 
effects of the presence of natural resources on the occurrence of conflict events. (Dube 
 Recent contributions to the resource curse literature include van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2010), Haber 1
and Maldonado (2011), Bruckner et al. (2012) and Wacziarg (2012), Von der Goltz and Barnwal (2014). 
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and Vargas, 2013; Angrist and Kugler, 2008; Maystadt et al., 2014; Buhaug and Rod, 
2006 and Berman et al., 2015). 
The outburst in violence brought about by oil price shocks in Colombia consisted mainly 
of civilian massacres, which could have affected the education of children through 
several pathways. First, the massacres created stress and anxiety in children, which have 
been shown to be detrimental to students’ behavior and performance (Sharkey et al., 
2012, 2014; Bowen and Bowen 1999; Delaney-Black 2002; Hurt et al. 2001). Second, the 
higher violence caused massive and forced population displacements, which meant loss of 
income and assets, gaps in school enrollment, and challenging adjustments to new 
settings (Uwaifo and Wharton, 2013; Stermac et al., 2013). Third, regions with high 
conflict levels were likely to have attracted less qualified teachers, which decreased the 
education quality for the children who stay in high conflict zones (Grogger, 1997; 
Sánchez and Rodríguez, 2010). 
To assess the effect of oil price shocks on educational attainment in Colombia, I estimate 
a reduced-form equation of the relationship between education and oil price shocks, and 
complement it with an exploration of mechanisms behind the results. I use a difference-
in-differences methodology, where international oil prices are interacted with the amount 
of oil produced in each municipality. This approach captures the exposure of each 
municipality to exogenous changes in international oil prices. Oil production is measured 
before the analysis period, so that the estimates are unaffected by any endogenous 
response of oil extraction to national economic conditions, which could have also 
affected education.  2
To assess the effect of oil price shocks on education, this paper uses data from several 
Colombian sources. It employs a unique dataset that records illegal armed groups’ 
attacks in over 950 municipalities from 1988 to 2003.  I use administrative data on 3
 The concern that Colombia’s oil production could endogenously drive international oil prices is minor, 2
because Colombia is a relatively small exporter of oil.
 The data are produced by the Center for the Study of Armed Conflict (CERAC), a private research 3
center for conflict analysis.
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school enrollment from the Ministry of Education and individual level data from the 
2005 Census to measure school enrollment and educational attainment. I also use data 
on municipal public finances and investment by sector from the Ministry of Finance, to 
assess the effect of oil price shocks on municipal revenue and expenditures. 
The results show that oil price shocks increased national monetary transfers to local 
governments in the form of oil royalties by 5.8% per year between 1998 and 2005. 
However, the rise in oil prices had limited effects on years of schooling and on whether a 
child is behind grade for his age. The higher oil prices produce small negative effects on 
primary school enrollment.  
To explore the mechanisms behind these results, I assess the effect of oil price shocks on 
violence (the main channel explored in this paper) and social investment. The findings 
suggest that the results are explained by the investment of oil resources in social sectors 
other than education, together with the existence of the civil conflict which was further 
intensified with oil price shocks. Indeed, the evidence reveals that the rise in oil prices 
between 1998 and 2005 translated into an 8% annual average increase in illegal right-
wing paramilitary attacks, consistent with other findings in the resource curse literature. 
This last result supports the main hypothesis of this paper, that violence could have an 
important role in the limited effect of oil price shocks on education.   
I also explore the role of local labor markets in explaining the results, since increases in 
wages could induce children to drop out of school and enter the work force, as pointed 
out previously by the literature (Cascio and Narayan, 2015; Santos, 2014; Kruger, 2007; 
Black, McKinnish and Sanders, 2005; Duryea and Arends-Kuenning, 2003). The 
evidence suggests that the effects of oil price shocks on local labor markets were 
relatively small and imprecisely estimated. A 1% increase in oil prices is estimated to 
have increased wages by 0.1% and number of hours worked by 0.01%, in the average oil 
municipality. Both estimates are insignificant and substantively small, when compared 
to the effect of price shocks on commodities that, unlike oil, are labor intensive. Indeed, 
as Dube and Vargas (2013) show, a 1% increase in the price of coffee (a labor intensive 
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sector), increased wages by 0.5% and number of hours worked by 0.43%, an effect that is 
at least five times higher than the effect of oil price shocks. 
The findings of this paper are relevant to other countries that are rich in natural 
resources (legally or illegally extracted) and are also embedded in civil conflicts. Such is 
the case of Iran, Libya, Iraq or Qatar, which are big oil exporters and also have been 
affected by short or long term civil wars. In addition, the results are also relevant for 
countries that produce or transport illegal drugs and are affected by drug-cartel related 
violence, since a surge in illegal drug prices generates high profits that rarely benefit 
local residents, and instead bring high levels of violence (Angrist and Kugler, 2008). 
Such is the case of México, Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras. 
This paper contributes to the literature by providing an additional explanation for the 
null effect of natural resource shocks on education. Existing studies in civil-war free 
contexts have ascribed a bigger role to child labor. Kruger (2007), Black, Mckinnish and 
Sanders (2005) and Cascio and Narayan (2015) found that natural resource shocks 
increased the wages of low-skilled workers. The higher wages increased the opportunity 
cost of studying, inducing children into employment and out of school. Yet, when the 
price shocks happen in the context of a civil conflict, this paper provides evidence of 
violence as an alternative mechanism. 
In exploring a different pathway, this paper also contributes to the literature by bringing 
together insights from two different research fields. The first field is the resource curse 
literature previously mentioned, which showed that natural resources increase conflicts. 
The second field is the literature on the negative effects of civil conflicts on human 
capital accumulation. Studies in Perú (León, 2012), Rwanda (Akresh and de Walque, 
2010), Germany (Akbulut-Yuksel, 2008), Guatemala (Chamarbagwala, and Morán, 
2011) and Colombia (Duque, 2014; Sánchez and Dominguez, 2012) find that adults who 
were exposed to civil conflicts during childhood achieve between 0.3 and 1.1 less years of 
education than non-exposed ones. The findings in these two strands of the literature are 
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consistent with the hypothesis of this paper, that any positive effect of natural resource 
shocks on education, can be nullified by the negative effects of the civil conflict. 
Finally, this paper provides an additional explanation for the limited effect of additional 
local government revenue on social welfare in low-income countries. The existing 
literature has attributed the lack of an effect to low institutional quality  (Robinson et 4
al., 2006; Mehlum et al. 2006) or to local governments obtaining most of their resources 
from external sources, such as natural resources rents  (Gadenne and Singhal, 2014; 5
Martinez, 2015; Paler, 2013; Martin, 2014). This paper suggests yet another mechanism, 
that can even amplify the phenomena pointed to by the existing literature. If natural 
resource shocks fuel civil conflicts in the context of weak institutions, then local 
governments would be even less able to raise social welfare in the presence of these 
shocks.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives background 
information on oil resources and the civil conflict in Colombia. Section 3 describes the 
different sources of data used. Section 4 presents the estimates of the effect of oil price 
shocks on school enrollment and public finances. Section 5 follows by presenting 
evidence of violence as a mechanism, as well as other possible mechanisms. Section 6 
concludes.  
2. Background: The Context of Oil Price Shocks and Education 
This section explains the lack of an effect of oil price shocks on education, in the context 
of the civil conflict in Colombia. The section begins by explaining how oil resources are 
transferred to oil municipalities and why these resources should be expected to improve 
education. The discussion then turns to a brief description of the civil conflict in 
Colombia, and how oil price shocks have fueled it. Finally, the relationship between the 
 Examples are weak accountability systems, low state competence, dysfunctional democracies, weak rule 4
of law and unsatisfactory protection of property and civil rights.
 In particular, this strand of the literature hypothesizes that tax-payers hold local governments 5
accountable only for how they spend tax resources, leading local politicians to often spend external 
resources inefficiently or for their own benefit. 
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civil conflict and educational attainment in Colombia is examined, in the context of the 
literature of the effect of violence on education. The conclusion of this section is that 
illegal paramilitary groups have used the oil money transferred to municipalities to fund 
massacres of civilians, that spread fear, led to forced displacement and created gaps in 
school enrollment. 
2.1. The sources and uses of oil royalties in Colombia 
Oil royalties represent a share of oil taxes that the national government transfers to oil 
municipalities, in exchange for the exploration of oil in their territory. The central 
government taxes 8-25% of oil profits, depending on the level of production. Eighty 
percent of the oil tax revenue is preserved in a stabilization fund. Of the 20% remaining, 
the central government keeps between 8-32% and transfers 47-52% to departments 
(states) and 12-32% to municipalities, depending on the level of production. As a result 
of the transfer, municipalities receive between 2-6% of the oil tax revenue collected, 
depending on the level of oil production. 
The transfer of oil resources to oil municipalities is the result of a major decentralization 
process that happened in the early 90s, which delegated to local governments the 
responsibility of implementing local social programs. To perform the new duties, the 
decentralization provided municipalities with additional financial resources, among 
which are oil royalties. The resources are transferred to the municipalities under the 
condition that the money would be invested in specific social sectors. The majority of oil 
royalties (75%), in particular, should be spent on health, education, and water 
sanitation, until some minimum standards are achieved.  Although oil royalties are 6
earmarked, municipalities have discretion on how to spend the resources within those 
sectors (e.g. whether to use the resources to build new schools or to pay teachers’ 
salaries). Given that education is one of the sectors mandated to receive oil royalties, it 
 Once those benchmarks have been satisfied, the local government can spend up to 90% of the transfers 6
on projects prioritized in their development plan.
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would be expected that oil price shocks bring gains to education outcomes in oil 
municipalities. 
2.2. The Colombian civil conflict and how it was fueled by oil price shocks 
The Colombian civil war has its roots in La Violencia, a violent confrontation between 
the two traditional political parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, which took 
place from 1948-1958. The power sharing agreement that ended this confrontation was 
perceived to exclude representation of the rural poor and other political forces. This 
perception of exclusion contributed to the formation of revolutionary leftist guerrilla 
groups, which launched a communist insurgency during the 1960s. In response to 
guerrilla extortion and violence, the 1980s saw the rise of a first generation of right-wing 
paramilitary groups, formed by drug lords and the rural elite.  
The conflict remained low intensity during the 1980s, but escalated sharply during the 
late 1990s for a number of different reasons, including the coalition of paramilitary 
groups as a unified group. Before 1997, the paramilitary operated as isolated cells with 
low intensity violence, but they combined into a unified group in 1997 (AUC  is its 7
acronym in Spanish) in response to an acceleration of left-wing guerrilla violence. This 
formation of the coalition coincided with a sharp increase in paramilitary violence 
(Figure 2) and allowed the unified group to emerge as an important armed group, which 
was estimated to have over 15,000 fighters at its peak in 2001-2003. Paramilitary 
members attained a vast power that embedded them in the government military (Dube 
and Vargas, 2013), local politics (López, 2010; Acemoglu et al., 2013) and the regional 
economy (Indepaz, 2008). This wide sphere of influence enabled the subjugation of 
entire populations (Restrepo and Spagat, 2004). 
During the sample period studied in this paper, the conflict can be characterized as 
three-sided, with the government military, the guerrillas and the paramilitary groups 
 Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia or the United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia7
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fighting one another . However, for the purposes of this paper, I focus only on the 8
paramilitary, which is the illegal armed group that has syphoned oil royalties from local 
governments under the threat of force. The greater amounts of money transferred to 
municipalities that produced oil increased the paramilitary’s incentives to exert control. 
These incentives were exacerbated by the fact that local governments had low capacity 
to fight theft and extortion, leaving local leaders vulnerable. 
The media has documented how the paramilitary threatened government officials to 
grant public contracts to particular firms and then extorted executives in those 
companies to extract the oil rents (Semana, 2007). Another form of extortion was to 
kidnap and murder mayors, to directly extract oil and gas royalties from municipality 
coffers (El Tiempo, 2007). Oil price shocks fueled the civil conflict, because paramilitary 
groups used violence to extort the oil money and funded their war activities with this 
money. Indeed, as Figure 1 shows, paramilitary violence in municipalities that produced 
oil increased in years of high oil prices, compared to municipalities with no oil 
production . 9
2.3. How does a more acute civil conflict limit educational attainment? 
The previous subsections explained how oil price shocks ended up fueling the civil 
conflict in Colombia by financing the war activities of the paramilitary groups. Here I 
address how this increase in violence affected children’s educational outcomes and how 
violence in the context of the civil conflict compares to other forms of crime.  
 Typically, however, the state and the paramilitary groups have been unofficially allied in fighting the 8
guerrillas.
 A first glance to Figure 1 could wrongly lead to conclude the opposite (that increases in paramilitary 9
violence in oil municipalities led to increases in oil prices, and not vice versa). However, this scenario is 
very unlikely. Oil prices started to increase for exogenous reasons on 1998 and this happened, by 
coincidence, one year after the collusion of the paramilitary groups. The 1997 collusion was the response 
of the paramilitary to the rising power of the left-wing guerrillas throughout the Colombian territory. 
After this collusion, paramilitary violence significantly increased, even more so in oil municipalities, 
following the exogenous increases in oil prices.
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Paramilitary groups used as a war strategy civilian massacres, defined as killings of four 
or more defenseless people with some selectiveness regarding the people killed or the 
place where they were killed. These massacres were central for the paramilitaries to 
control local populations. The violent massacres deterred civilians from supporting the 
left-wing guerrillas, therefore cutting the provision of food, medicine and messages to 
paramilitaries (Kirk, 2003).  
Children living in the municipalities where massacres happened were exposed to violence 
because, although small , massacres tended to occur in rural low density population 10
areas (Restrepo and Spagatt, 2004) . As a consequence, children were likely to witness 11
or hear about massacres, combats, shootings, bombs or kidnappings, and may even have 
had family members who died or were injured. 
Paramilitary attacks were high in frequency and were spread throughout the country. In 
fact, from 1988 to 2005, paramilitary groups committed 1,137 attacks, 648 of which were 
massacres. One third of the 1,100 municipalities suffered at least one attack, specifically, 
339 municipalities. The attacks perpetrated by the paramilitary increased dramatically 
after the formation of AUC in 1997, and was manifested both in more massacres as well 
as other types of attacks (Figure 2). 
The frequent and intense paramilitary attacks spread fear and caused massive forced 
displacements. Many families fled to small, medium and large urban areas in search of 
security, making Colombia the country with the second largest population of internally 
displaced persons in the world, after Sudan (UN Security Council, 2009). These factors 
profoundly affected children’s education for several reasons. 
First, the higher violence spread fear amongst the population, producing stress and 
anxiety in children, which has been shown to negatively affect student’s socio-emotional, 
 There was an average of six civilians killed in each paramilitary massacre (Restrepo and Spagatt, 2004)10
 Some of the massacres involved stealing property and burning houses and businesses, and were 11
complemented with public road blockages, to prevent the provision of food to the populations (Grupo de 
Memoria Histórica, 2013).
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behavioral and cognitive domains (Sharkey et al. 2012; Osofsky 1999; Shahinfar, 
Kupersmidt, and Matza 2001; Margolin and Gordis 2004; Bingenheimer et al. 2005). 
Similar to other traumatic experiences (such as maltreatment), exposure to local 
violence and danger are also associated with lower performance, cognitive skills, grade 
point average and school attendance (Sharkey et al. 2014; Bowen and Bowen 1999; 
Delaney-Black 2002; Hurt et al. 2001).  
Second, the paramilitary attacks created sudden and large flows of families migrating 
out of violent areas. With the migration, families lost their income and assets, which are 
factors that have been shown to affect negatively children’s schooling (Thomas et al., 
2004; Duryea, Lam and Levinson, 2007; Jacoby and Skoufias, 1996). Moreover, children 
transited to new and unfamiliar school systems. This transition can be challenging and 
may create gaps in school enrollment, particularly if the pre-migration academic 
experiences have been unstable and interrupted (Stermac et al. 2013; Uwaifo and 
Wharton, 2013). Formal education for some children may be curtailed due to lack of 
provision of education in the new location (Hart, 2013) or might be delayed because the 
placement process requires sensitive and appropriate determination of the proper grade 
level, as well as an assessment of any learning disabilities or psychological difficulties 
(Kapreilian-Churchill, 1996; Stermac et al. 2013). Conversely, it might happen that 
forcible displacement could open up the possibility of higher quality schooling that had 
been unavailable previously (Hart, 2014). The quality of education in the areas where 
families relocate could be higher, because displaced families tend to flee to urban areas, 
where the provision of public services tends to be higher and better.  
Third, violence may limit the local supply of education. Acute episodes of violence can 
cause destruction of physical infrastructure (e.g. school, buses, libraries) that are crucial 
inputs for children’s education (Barrera and Ibañez, 2004). In addition, teachers may, on 
the one hand, avoid taking or leave positions in cities or towns with high conflict levels 
(Sánchez and Rodríguez, 2010) or, on the other hand, demand higher salaries to teach in 
municipalities highly affected by the war (Grogger, 1997). 
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Violence in the context of an armed conflict (such as paramilitary attacks) needs to be 
studied as distinct from other forms of violence (such as urban crime). Indeed, violence 
due to armed conflict differs from other forms of violence in the level of cruelty and 
scope of the methods used. During civil conflict, combatants use pillage, predation, 
extortion and deliberate violence against civilians to acquire control of territories, 
lucrative assets, trade networks and labor (Villar-Márquez and Harper, 2010). The latter 
is particularly salient in Colombia, since minors have been constantly recruited by illegal 
armed forces. These  differences mean that the education effects of civil conflict can be 
more acute than the educational effects of urban crime.  
Although it may be more severe, civil conflict does share some features of urban crime, 
since criminal groups use murder to gain control in both contexts. The Colombian civil 
conflict, in particular,  resulted in higher homicide rates during its most acute period, as 
the illegal armed groups (paramilitary in particular) used murder to control the 
population. Indeed, as Figure 3 shows, after the creation of the AUC in 1997, the rise in 
homicide rates in the late 90s coincided with a sharp rise in paramilitary homicides. 
3. Empirical Strategy: Difference-in-Differences Methodology 
This section explains the empirical strategy used to assess the effect of oil price shocks 
on education outcomes. The method consists on interacting the exogenous international 
oil price with the amount of oil produced in each municipality in the baseline year 
(1988). This section explains why this method alleviates possible endogenous 
correlations between oil production and education, and rules out that international oil 
prices could be endogenously driven by Colombia’s oil production.  
The empirical strategy follows a difference-in-differences estimator, by assessing whether 
changes in oil prices affect the education outcome disproportionately in municipalities 
that produce more oil. This strategy has been used in recent studies that investigate the 
effect of commodity price shocks on diverse outcomes in Colombia (Dube and Vargas 
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(2013), Carreri and Dube (2014), Santos (2014), Idrobo, Mejia and Tribin (2014), 
Martinez (2016)). 
In this approach, time variation stems from movements in international oil prices, which 
is exogenous to Colombia’s production as the country is a relatively small exporter of 
oil. According to the US Energy Information Administration, Colombia is the 18th 
largest exporter of oil with less than 1% of the world exports. Figure 1 shows there was 
significant variation in oil prices during the sample period (1996-2005): after following a 
decreasing trend until 1998, oil prices increased steadily until the end of the analysis 
period.  
Cross-sectional variation comes from the distribution of oil production across different 
municipalities in the baseline year (1988), which alleviates the potential endogeneity 
concerns for two reasons. First, because oil production is determined by the (exogenous) 
spatial distribution of oil reserves. Second, because production is measured in the 
baseline year, which means it does not reflect potential endogenous oil discovery efforts 
or extraction rates correlated with education over the period of analysis.  
3.1. Specification at the individual level 
The specification to estimate the effect of oil price shocks on individual education 
outcomes can be represented by the following equation 
!  (1) 
where !  is the education outcome for child i who was born in municipality m, region r 
and year t; ! are municipality of birth fixed effects; !  are year of birth fixed effects. 
!  are child level characteristics, that include indicators for child’s gender and race, 
head of the household gender and level of education, household size and whether the 
household lives in urban or rural area. ! are time-varying municipality controls, that 
include log population in municipality of birth m in year of birth t and !  are region 
yimrt = β0 + (Oilm ×OPi )γ + Xi







of birth linear trends for Colombia’s four major regions  and also for coca producing 12
municipalities.  
The interaction term ! captures the exposure of child i to oil price shocks during 
different stages of his life, and its corresponding coefficient !  is the main parameter of 
interest. In a first specification, I estimate the effect of the lifetime exposure to oil price 
shocks on educational outcomes, where the main term of interest takes the form 
!  (1.1) 
where !  is the oil production level in the municipality of birth m during 1988 and 
!  is the log oil price in year t+k. The subscript k denotes age, so the interaction 
term ! captures the exposure of child i, who was born in year t, to oil price 
shocks when he was age k  and the sum is the accumulated exposure of 13
child i to oil price shocks over his lifetime.  In this specification measures the effect of 14
a lifetime exposure to oil price shocks on educational outcomes. 
A natural question that arises is whether the effect of being exposed to oil price shocks 
differs depending on the age of exposure. To answer this question, I estimate a second 
specification, where the main term of interest takes the form 
!    (1.2) 
Oilm ×OPi
γ










(Oilm ×OPi )γ = γ 1 Oilm ×OPt+k
k=0
6
∑ + γ 2 Oilm ×OPt+k
k=7
11




 The regions are Andean, Caribbean, Southeastern and Pacific.12
 This term takes zero if the child had not yet achieved age k when he was observed in 2005.13
 A natural concern when several log terms are added like in this expression, is that the different terms 14
would cancel with each other. This is because log(x) can be both positive (for large values of x) or 
negative (when x is very small). However, this is not a major concern because oil prices in the period of 
analysis were high enough, such as log oil price was always positive and large.
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where the sum ! is the accumulated exposure of child i to oil price shocks 
between ages a and b. In equation (1.2), ! captures the effect of exposure to oil price 
shocks from ages 0 to 6,   from ages 7 to 11 and  from ages 12 to 17.   15
In equation (1), the inclusion of municipality of birth fixed effects ! takes care of 
possible sources of bias coming from time-invariant differences between oil and non-oil 
municipalities. For example, as shown in Table 2, oil municipalities tend to be more 
urban, and places with high urbanicity levels tend to have higher quality institutions 
that supply better public goods (such as education). The municipality fixed effects 
control for observed and unobserved differences between the oil and non-oil regions that 
are constant over time. 
In addition, the year of birth fixed effects !  control for time trends, absorbing 
aggregate shocks that could bias the results. For instance, the change in the trend of oil 
prices (which decreased until 1998, and increased steadily afterwards) coincided with a 
historical economic recession in 1999, that decreased school enrollment rates. By 
including year fixed effects, I use local rather aggregate variation to identify the effect of 
oil price shocks on the education outcome. 
The inclusion of region linear time trends !  accounts for potential omitted variables 
since oil may be concentrated in particular regions, and education may be trending 
upward in these locations based on other factors such as varying economic growth rates. 
The trends in the coca and non-coca municipalities also mitigate potential omitted 
variable bias since coca presence may be correlated with oil presence, and both coca 
planting and government eradication efforts increased dramatically during the 1990s, 










 The most flexible specification consists of estimating the effect of being exposed to oil price shocks each 15
year of life, which means estimating the coefficient for each term Oilm x OPt+k. However, these terms are 
highly collinear with each other making the estimation unfeasible. 
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Oil prices are measured in logs, so the coefficients in the interaction terms can be 
interpreted as semi-elasticities, weighted by oil production in the municipality. Standard 
errors are clustered at the municipality of birth level, to account for possible correlation 
of errors within municipalities across time.  
3.2. Specification at the municipality-year level 
The specification at the municipality-year level is used to explore the mechanisms 
behind the lack of an effect of oil price shocks on education, by estimating how oil price 
shocks affect public finances and paramilitary violence. This specification is also utilized 
to confirm that the effect of larger oil resources on education is limited, using school 
enrollment data aggregated at the municipality level. 
The specification can be represented by the following equation 
!  (2) 
where !  is the outcome in municipality m in year t; ! is the oil production level in 
municipality m during 1988; !  is the log of international price of oil in year t; ! are 
municipality fixed effects; !  are year fixed effects; and ! are time-varying municipality 
controls, that include log population. !  are region linear trends for Colombia’s four 
major regions and also for coca producing municipalities. In equation (2), !  captures 
the differential effect of the oil price on public finances or school enrollment in 
municipalities producing more oil. 
4. Data 
This section describes the several sources of data used to study the effect of oil price 
shocks on education. It explains how the different databases are merged together to 
create the sample of study. It shows that the sample of study is representative of rural 
areas, where the Colombian civil conflict is more acute.  
4.1. Armed conflict data at the municipality level 







The armed conflict data comes from a detailed event-based database for the period 
1988-2005, with broad coverage in rural areas where the conflict is more acute. It was 
constructed by the Conflict Analysis Resource Center (CERAC is its acronym in 
Spanish) and provides the main independent variable of interest in this study, the count 
of paramilitary attacks per municipality and year. 
The primary sources of this database are a network of priests from the Catholic Church 
with representation in almost every municipality in Colombia, and over 25 newspapers 
with national and local coverage. The dataset, which is described thoroughly by 
Restrepo, Spagat, and Vargas (2004) and Dube and Vargas (2013), is constructed on the 
basis of the events listed in the annexes of periodicals published by two Colombian 
human rights NGOs (CINEP and Justicia y Paz). Since the magazines include reports 
from Catholic priests, who are often located in rural areas that are unlikely to receive 
press coverage, the database has broad representation in rural areas. For every event the 
conflict dataset records its type, the date, location, perpetrator and victims involved in 
the incident.  
This paper uses the total count of paramilitary attacks per municipality and year 
registered in this database, to construct the main independent variable of the analysis. 
Paramilitary attacks in the CERAC database are defined as violent events implemented 
solely by paramilitaries without effective resistance  and include fire upon other armed 16
groups and attacks against the civil population. The attacks against the civilians are 
overwhelmingly massacres , and to a lesser extent are incursions (attacks on villages), 17
check points (search of vehicles and questioning occupants) and public road blockages 
(Restrepo and Spagatt, 2004). 
The count of paramilitary attacks is available for 998 municipalities, of the (approx.) 
1,100 municipalities in Colombia. The municipalities not included in the sample 
 CERAC has an opposite category for attacks: clashes, which are fights between two armed groups. 16
Attacks that lead to clashes are classified as simple clashes.
 Between 1988 and 2003, 70% of the attacks against the civil population implemented by paramilitaries 17
were massacres (Restrepo and Spagatt, 2004).
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correspond mostly to the largest metropolitan areas in Colombia. These areas are 
omitted from the CERAC sample because the insurgency is concentrated in rural areas, 
making the dynamics of the conflict very different between rural and urban areas . 18
4.2. Education outcomes at the individual level coming from the 2005 Census 
The main dependent variables of the analysis, individual education outcomes, come from 
the 2005 Census collected by the Colombian Bureau of Statistics (DANE is the acronym 
in Spanish). The education outcomes studied are school enrollment, whether the child is 
behind grade for his age  and the number of years of schooling.  19
The 2005 Census data was obtained from IPUMS-International (Minnesota Population 
Center 2011). It includes a representative sample of four million individuals, accounting 
for 10% of the total population, and provides rich demographic and socio-economic 
information on each member of the household. One virtue of using the Census is that it 
reports the municipality and year of birth for each individual. This allows me to 
approximate each child’s exposure to oil price shocks, by measuring the exposure of his 
birth municipality to oil price shocks. Using the municipality of birth, as opposed to the 
municipality of residence, also allows me to assess possible endogenous household 
migration in response to oil price shocks. 
Although Colombia has approximately 1,100 municipalities, they are grouped into 532 
census-units, which I also call grouped municipalities. The census-units are created by 
DANE, such that small municipalities (with less than 20,000 inhabitants) are grouped 
together with their neighboring municipalities, to form larger entities . This paper 20
includes children who were born in 496 of the 532 grouped municipalities, given the 
 The CERAC data was obtained from the Dube and Vargas (2013) replication package. Therefore, the 18
paramilitary violence information is available for the 988 municipalities included in their estimation 
sample. Besides excluding large urban areas, the authors also exclude areas where violence information 
was missing some years, to yield a balanced panel of municipalities.
 A child is behind grade for his age if his age minus his years of schooling is 8 or higher.19
 Combining municipalities in this manner does not represent a problem for data analysis since each 20
municipality in the grouped areas is clearly identified.
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availability of data on the armed conflict. The children excluded from the analysis are 
those who were born in a group of municipalities with incomplete armed conflict 
information , meaning large cities and their metropolitan areas, as described in section 21
4.1. 
4.3. Education outcomes at the municipality level coming from administrative data 
The secondary dependent variable of the analysis, school enrollment at the municipality 
level, is measured using administrative data coming from the Ministry of Education. 
The data records enrollment in primary and secondary schools by municipality and year, 
for the period 1996 to 2005. This information was obtained from the repository of 
municipality level data compiled by the Center of Economic Studies (CEDE for its 
acronym in Spanish) at Universidad de los Andes.  
Enrollment rates in primary and secondary school are obtained by dividing the number 
of students in primary (secondary) school, by the population in age of attending primary 
(secondary), e.g. children 7-11 (12-17) years old. The population by age range was also 
obtained from the CEDE database, and was constructed based on the Census 2005 
information and projections of municipality population by year.  
4.4. Public finances data and other municipality information 
The public finances data is available for the 1996-2005 period, and comes from the 
municipality accounting sheets provided by the National Planning Department (DNP for 
its acronym in Spanish). It records the transfers from the national government to the 
municipality, which include oil royalties, as well as municipality social expenditures. 
This information allows estimating the effect of oil price shocks on local government 
revenue and expenditures. 
The public revenue data records most oil transfers under a specific category that 
registers national transfers with a mandatory destination. Oil royalties are classified in 
 A group of municipalities has incomplete armed conflict information if it has at least one municipality 21
with no armed conflict data. 
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this category because they are transferred to municipalities under the condition of 
spending them on the health, education and water sanitation sectors . The data also 22
includes other sources of revenue, such as municipality tax and non-tax revenue, 
transfers from the departments (states) and discretionary transfers from the national 
government. 
Local social expenditures, on the other hand, are recorded under a social investment 
category, that includes teachers’ wages, school materials, and hospital expenditures, 
among other things . This social investment category belongs to a broader investment 23
category in the public finances sheets that also records investment in physical assets, 
labeled as fixed capital accumulation. The public expenditures data also includes other 
types of expenditures, such as local government operational costs and debt interest 
payment.  
The public finances data is complemented with a separate source of information that 
records municipality investment by sector, used by the DNP to feed the accounting 
sheets. This data includes municipality investment in education, health, water sanitation 
and transportation, among other sectors. The data does not discriminate between 
investment in physical assets (fixed capital accumulation) and social investment, so it is 
comparable to the broad investment category in the public finances sheets . 24
Figures 1 and 2 show that oil and non-oil municipalities differenced from each other in 
terms of public revenue. In years with high oil prices, oil municipalities displayed higher 
transfers from the national government with a mandatory destination (which include oil 
royalties). However, they did not display higher social expenditures, compared to non-oil 
municipalities.   
 Seventy five percent of the transfers should be spent on health, education, water and sewage, until some 22
minimum standards are achieved. Once those benchmarks have been satisfied, the local government can 
spend up to 90% of the transfers on projects prioritized in their development plan. 
 These social operational costs are classified as “investment” following the recommendations of the IMF 23
for local public accounting (DNP, 2014; IMF, 2001).  
 Total investment reported by the two sources of data has similar trends and magnitudes. There are 24
some small differences, probably due to the process followed to clean the sector investment database.
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The rest of the data at the municipality level is combined from several sources. Oil price 
data comes from IFS (International Financial Statistics, IMF) and oil production in 
1988 comes from the Ministry of Mines and Energy. Municipality population by year is 
calculated based on information coming from the 2005 Census and the Colombian 
Bureau of Statistics (DANE for its acronym in Spanish).  Finally, coca cultivation in 25
1994 by municipality comes from the National Department of Narcotics (DNE for its 
acronym in Spanish); this data is used to control for linear trends in coca municipalities.  
4.5. Sample and Summary Statistics 
This paper uses two estimation samples to assess the effect of oil price shocks on 
education and its underlying mechanisms: the first sample is at the individual level and 
the second one is at the municipality-year level. Both samples are representative of rural 
and small urban areas, where the conflict is more acute. 
4.5.1. Individual Level Sample 
The individual level sample is based on the 2005 Census and is used to assess the effect 
of oil price shocks on individual education outcomes. The sample consists of 631,285 
children who were 7-17 years old in 2005, who belong to the 1988-1998 birth cohorts. 
These cohorts were chosen such that the children would be old enough to attend school, 
but also young enough so they would have been born on or after 1988, which is the year 
when oil production is measured.  Using these cohorts also allows me to measure 26
exposure to violence since birth, because the armed conflict starts in 1988.   
The sample excludes children who i) were born in a census-unit (or group of 
municipalities) for which information on the armed conflict is incomplete; or ii) have no 
information on some of the control variables included in the regressions. Table A1 in the 
 Municipality population is estimated using the share of the municipality in the department population 25
in the 2005 Census (which is the last Census available) and the projections of department population by 
year, published by DANE.
 It is important for children in the sample not to be born before 1988, because otherwise oil production 26
could have responded to economic conditions in the first years of their lives, making it an endogenous 
production measure.
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Appendix compares children in sample with those out of sample, dividing the latter 
according to the reason for the exclusion (i or ii). The Table reveals that most of the 
children not in the sample are excluded on the basis of (i). The excluded children tend 
to mainly live in urban areas, consistent with the fact that large cities and their 
metropolitan areas are excluded from the armed conflict data (as explained in Sections 
4.1 and 4.2). This difference between children in and out of sample implies that the 
results of this study are representative of rural and small urban areas, where the conflict 
is more acute. 
To measure the exposure of children to oil price shocks, I use the oil production level in 
their municipality of birth as of 1988. The census does not provide exact information on 
the municipality of birth, but instead on the group of municipalities (census-unit) where 
the child was born. Therefore, I create an aggregated measure of oil production in the 
census-unit of birth, by calculating the average oil production in 1988 in the group of 
municipalities where the child was born, weighted by the municipality population in 
1988.   27
The exposure of children to paramilitary attacks each year of their lives is calculated in 
a similar way to exposure to oil price shocks. Specifically, paramilitary attacks at age a 
are calculated as the average paramilitary attacks that happened when the child was age 
a in the group of municipalities where the child was born, weighted by the population in 
each of these municipalities. It is possible to measure the exposure to violence since age 
zero because the children in the sample were born on or after 1988. 
Table 1 presents statistics of children according to whether they were exposed to oil 
price shocks or not (e.g. whether they were born in a municipality that produced oil in 
1988). It reveals that the educational outcomes of both type of children are remarkably 
similar and even tend to be slightly worse in oil municipalities, since children in oil 
 It is necessary to weight the average by the population in the municipality, because the probability that 27
the child was born in a particular municipality with a specific oil production is proportional to the 
population in that municipality. 
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municipalities attend school at rates one percentage point lower, and one percentage 
point more of them are behind grade for their age (Column 3). The table also shows 
that children living in oil municipalities are exposed to paramilitary violence at much 
higher rates. The proportion of children ever exposed to a paramilitary attack is 16 
percentage points higher in oil municipalities. These children have also been exposed to 
6 more paramilitary attacks over their lifetime. 
4.5.2. Municipality-year level sample 
The municipality-year level sample consists of a balanced panel of 936 municipalities 
with information on paramilitary violence, school enrollment and public finances for the 
period 1996-2005. Although this sample is mainly employed to assess the effect of oil 
price shocks on public finances and paramilitary violence, it is also utilized to provide 
further evidence of the lack of an effect of oil price shocks on school enrollment.  
The municipality-year level sample differs from the individual level sample, in that the 
municipalities are not aggregated in census-units (or groups of municipalities). Instead, 
the original municipality boundaries are preserved to take the maximum advantage of 
the underlying geographic variation in the data. Also, while the individual level sample 
utilizes violence information since 1988, the municipality-year level sample includes 
information since 1996, when the school enrollment information at the municipality level 
starts to be available.  28
Similar to the individual level sample, the municipality-year level sample excludes large 
urban areas, because there is no paramilitary violence information for them . In 29
addition, it excludes very small rural areas with school enrollment data missing some 
years. Therefore, this sample is approximately representative of medium rural and small 
 Another reason for this choice is that the public finances data did not include oil royalties until 1996, 28
when the fiscal decentralization process started operating (Section 2.1. describes this process in more 
detail). 
 Our source of violence data (CERAC) excludes large metropolitan areas because the insurgency is 29
concentrated in rural areas, making the dynamics of the conflict very different from the cities. 
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urban areas . The final estimation sample contains 9,360 municipality-year observations 30
over the 10 year period. 
Table 2, which presents summary statistics of the municipalities in the sample by oil 
production, reveals that oil municipalities received higher transfers from the national 
government (in the form of royalties for the production of oil) during the analysis period 
(1996-2005). These transfers (labeled public transfers with mandatory destination), were 
on average 3 times higher in oil municipalities than in non-oil ones. Figure 1, which 
presents the trends in government transfers by oil production, also shows that the 
increases in government transfers to oil municipalities were higher in years when oil 
prices increased. 
Table 2 suggests that public social expenditures and primary school enrollment rates 
were higher in oil municipalities, which could be equivocally interpreted as the effect of 
higher oil resources on social welfare. However, this relationship could instead reflect the 
existence of other confounding factors that are correlated with education. As Table 2 
shows, oil municipalities tend to be larger and more urban, which are factors that are 
related with higher education levels. The existence of these confounding factors 
highlights the importance of including municipality fixed effects in the regressions and 
controlling for time-variant municipality characteristics . 31
Table 2 also reveals that paramilitary violence was significantly higher in the oil region, 
both in terms of the incidence and the intensity of the exposure to violence. In terms of 
 This sample is arguably useful to study the relationship between violence, oil production and education. 30
The exclusion of large urban areas is not a concern because the dynamics of the conflict are very different 
between rural and urban areas. The exclusion of small rural areas is not concerning either, because these 
municipalities do not produce oil, nor do they have significant levels of paramilitary violence. Table 14. in 
the Appendix, which compares the municipalities in and out of the sample, presents evidence of these 
facts.  
 According to Table 1, the individual level data reveals that the overall school enrollment rate is 31
remarkably similar between oil and non-oil municipalities. This would seem contradictory with the results 
in Table 2, which reveals that oil municipalities have higher primary enrollment rates. However, there is 
no such contradiction, because oil municipalities also have lower secondary enrollment rates (Table 2). 
When these two contrary forces combine (higher primary rates, together with lower secondary rates), the 
result in similar overall enrollment rates in oil and non-oil municipalities.
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incidence, the percent of municipalities that experienced at least one paramilitary attack 
was almost two times higher in the oil region (66% vs. 35%) during the analysis period. 
In terms of the intensity, oil municipalities suffered 4 times more paramilitary attacks 
than non-oil municipalities (4.2 vs. 1 attack). These stark differences seem to be driven 
by increases in oil prices, since years with high oil prices were followed by higher 
paramilitary attacks in the oil region, as revealed by Figure 1 . 32
5. Results: The Lack of an Effect of Oil Price Shocks on Education Outcomes 
This section describes the results of estimating the effect of oil price shocks on 
education. It shows that the increase in oil prices between 1998 and 2005 had limited 
effects on whether a child is behind grade for his age and on years of schooling. More 
surprising, increases in oil prices had small but negative effects on primary school 
enrollment in oil municipalities. 
Table 3 presents the results of estimating Equation (1) on children’s school enrollment. 
Columns 1 and 2 show the results for the entire sample (children 7-17 years old in 2005), 
while columns 3 to 6 divide the sample according to whether the child is in primary 
school age (7-11) or in secondary school age (12-17). Column 1, which presents the 
results for lifetime exposure to oil price shocks (as specified by equation 1.1), reveals 
that increases in oil prices have no effects on school enrollment since the coefficient in 
Column 1 is small and statistically insignificant. Furthermore, dividing the sample by 
age reveals that oil price shocks had small but surprisingly negative effects on 
enrollment of children of primary school age (Column 3).  
When the lifetime results are disaggregated by age of exposure in Columns 2, 4 and 6, it 
is not possible to identify a clear pattern. The sign of the coefficients is negative in some 
instances and positive in some others, depending on the sample used. Therefore, the 
 See footnote 9 for relevant information.32
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evidence is not conclusive with regards to the effect of exposure to oil price shocks at 
different ages.   33
Tables 4 and 5 display the results when the outcome considered is years of schooling and 
whether the child is behind grade for his age. The results for the latter are similar to 
those found for school enrollment, in that oil price shocks have limited effects on years 
of schooling and whether the child is on track in school (Column 1, in Table 4 and 5). 
When the sample is split according to age, however, it is found that oil price shocks 
seemed to help children of secondary school age to be on track in school and to increase 
their years of schooling (Column 5 in Tables 4 and 5). Nonetheless, these are small 
effects as explained in the next couple of paragraphs. 
To understand the magnitude of the coefficients in Tables 3 to 5, I calculate the annual 
change in education outcomes caused by a lifetime of exposure to oil price shocks. To 
calculate this annual change, consider the lifetime coefficient in Column 1 of Table 3. 
This coefficient is multiplied by the average oil production in oil municipalities (0.072 
hundred thousand barrels/day), which yields the semi-elasticity of school enrollment to 
oil prices in the average oil municipality. This semi-elasticity is then multiplied by the 
change in log oil prices between 1998 and 2005 (1.37), when oil prices tripled. The 
calculation reveals that school enrollment decreased 0.006481 percentage points in an 8-
year period, translating into an average change of -0.000814 in school enrollment per 
year, in the average oil municipality. In practical terms, this represents a zero effect. 
For illustration purposes, the interpreted coefficients are plotted in Figures 6 to 8, 
together with their 95% confidence level intervals. The Figures reveal that oil price 
shocks had limited effects on all three educational outcomes, since the confidence 
intervals include zero. There are two exceptions to this pattern, as described before. One 
is school enrollment of children of primary school age, which decreases when oil prices 
 The shift in the sign of the coefficients might be related with the fact that the variables for exposure at 33
a particular age are collinear. This problem was pointed out previously when describing the empirical 
strategy.
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increase. These negative effects are very small (0.0052 percentage points) but are 
statistically significant. The second exception is years of schooling (and being behind 
grade for their age) of children in secondary school age, which tend to improve when 
exposed to oil price increases. However, the size of these effects is extremely small 
(0.00024 more years of education or 0.0053 percentage points less likely to be behind in 
school).  
To further confirm the lack of an effect of higher oil prices on school enrollment, I repeat 
this exercise using the school enrollment data at the municipality-year level (as opposed 
to the education data at the individual level). For this matter, I estimate Equation 2 
with primary enrollment rates as the outcome and present the results in Table 6. The 
table reveals that oil price shocks not only had small effects on school enrollment, but it 
further confirms the negative and significant effects on primary school enrollment. The 
estimated coefficient suggests that primary school enrollment decreased by 0.14 
percentage points per year in the average oil municipality, when oil prices increased from 
1998 to 2005 . There is no evidence of any effects of oil price shocks on secondary 34
school enrollment. As Table 7 shows, the coefficient of the interaction between oil 
production and oil prices is negative, but statistically insignificant and very small, which 
is also consistent with the results at the individual level previously described. 
Overall, this section has shown that oil price shocks had null effects on children 
education outcomes. Furthermore, the evidence points in the direction of having small, 
but surprisingly negative effects on primary school enrollment. This paradoxical result 
happened in the context of a rise in oil royalties that, according to the Colombian law, 
should have been invested in education. The following section explores the mechanisms 
behind this result and provides evidence suggesting violence as a possible explanation. 
6. Mechanisms: Why is there a lack of an effect of oil price shocks on education? 
 This number is calculated by transforming the estimated semi-elasticity into annual percentage changes 34
in the average oil municipality, in the same manner that I interpreted the coefficients earlier in this 
section.
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This section explores the mechanisms behind this paradoxical result, by estimating the 
effect of oil price shocks on different outcomes at the municipality level. The section 
shows that oil price shocks increased national money transfers to local governments 
(including oil royalties) and that these additional resources were reserved for and later 
invested in the social sector. The investments, however, were concentrated in the health 
sector, but not on the education sector. This section also provides evidence that 
paramilitary violence increased with the additional oil resources. Taken together, these 
two results suggest that the higher violence brought by oil price shocks may have 
undermined any effect of the additional social investment, if there was indeed such an 
effect. 
6.1. Oil Price Shocks Increase Municipality Revenue and Expenditures 
In this section, I present the results of estimating the effect of oil price shocks on public 
finances. The specification used includes the contemporaneous exposure to oil price 
shocks as in equation (2), plus an additional term for the lagged exposure of 
municipalities to such shocks. The lagged term is added because oil resources in a given 
year could have been reserved to be spent the following year in specific investment 
projects. The specification can be represented by the following equation 
!   (3) 
where !  is public revenue or expenditures in municipality m in year t; ! is the oil 
production level in municipality m during 1988; !  is the log of international price of 
oil in year t; ! are municipality fixed effects; !  are year fixed effects; ! are time-
varying municipality controls and !  are region-specific linear time trends. 
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 7 report the effect of contemporaneous and lagged oil price 
shocks on total revenue and expenditures. The table reveals that increases in oil prices 
generated higher municipality revenue, since the coefficient of the contemporaneous 
exposure to oil price shocks in Column 1, oilprod88xlop(t), is positive and significant. 






Column 2 shows that the additional resources seem to have been spent in subsequent 
years, as the coefficient of oilprod88xlop(t-1) is significant and large, relative to the 
coefficient of oilprod88xlop(t), which is insignificant.  
To confirm that the additional oil resources were reserved and spent in subsequent 
years, Columns 3 to 5 present the effect of oil price shocks on the fiscal superavit and on 
sources of funding. The sources of funding include debt and bequests, where bequests 
refer to funds from previous years that were reserved to be spent in the current fiscal 
year, in specific projects. Positive bequests denote money reserved from previous fiscal 
years to be spent today, while negative bequests denote money from the current fiscal 
year reserved to be spent in the future. The results are presented in such a way that the 
sum of columns 3 to 5 is zero (e.g. that the superavit is used to pay debt or to reserve 
money for future fiscal years). 
The results in Columns 3 to 5 indicate that oil price shocks generated a superavit that 
was mostly reserved for future fiscal years. The coefficient of oilprod88xlop(t) for 
bequests is negative (Column 5), denoting funds being reserved for the future, and has 
almost the same magnitude as the coefficient for total superavit (Column 3). Some of 
the superavit was also used to pay debt, as the coefficient in Column 4 is negative and 
significant, although the coefficient is small relative to the coefficient of bequests. 
Consistent with these results, bequests this year are higher when there has been an oil 
price shock the year before, as the coefficient of oilprod88xlop(t-1) in Column 5 is 
positive and significant.  
How much did revenue and expenditures increase with oil price shocks? To answer this 
question, Table 8 transforms the coefficients in Table 7 into annual percentage changes 
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in the average oil municipality . Panel A displays the interpreted coefficients for 35
contemporaneous oil price shocks (e.g. oilprod88xlop(t) in Table 7), while Panel B 
presents the analog coefficients for lagged oil price shocks (e.g. oilprod88xlop (t-1)). In 
addition, Table 8 presents the effect of oil price shocks on additional specific revenue 
and expenditure categories of interest. The categories are government transfers to 
municipalities with mandatory destination (which include oil royalties) and investment, 
broken down into expenditures in physical assets (labeled fixed capital accumulation) 
and social investment (which includes teacher wages, school supplies, hospital 
expenditures, among other).     36
The table reveals that contemporaneous oil price shocks increased total revenue by 4% 
and, in particular, government transfers with mandatory destination (which include oil 
royalties) by 5.8% per year in the average oil municipality. As described earlier, this 
increase in revenue did not translate into higher total expenditures until later years. 
Column 2 in Panel A shows that the contemporaneous response of expenditures and 
investment to oil price shocks was limited, since the coefficient of oilprod88xlop(t) is 
insignificant and small (the percent change ranges between 0.5% and 0.8% per year). 
Instead, the additional oil money seems to have been invested later as evidenced by the 
coefficient of lagged oil price shocks in Column 2, Panel B. In particular, the increase in 
oil prices generated a rise in investment the following year, of 2.5% and 4.5% in physical 
assets and in the social sector, respectively.  
What was the money invested on? To answer this question, Table 9 reports the effect of 
oil price shocks on investment by sector.  It reveals that the additional oil resources are 37
 The percentage changes are calculated by multiplying the estimated coefficients by the average oil 35
production in oil municipalities (0.084 hundred thousand barrels/day), which yields the semi-elasticity of 
revenue/expenditures to oil prices in the average oil municipality. This semi-elasticity is then multiplied 
by the change in log oil prices between 1998 and 2005 (1.37), when oil prices tripled. The calculation gives 
the change in the dependent variable in an 8-year period. This number is then divided by 8 and by the 
average value of the dependent variable, yielding the average percentage change per year, in the average 
oil municipality.
 Appendix tables A.3 and A.4 present the effect of oil price shocks on other municipality revenue and 36
expenditure categories.  
 These categories of investment include both investment in physical assets and the social sector.37
!30
mostly invested in the health sector, as revealed by the contemporaneous and lagged 
coefficients in Column 1 of both Panels in the Table. In particular, contemporaneous 
increases in oil prices incremented health investment by 1.1%, while the lagged increases 
in prices boosted health expenditures by 2.7% (Column 2). Investment in education, on 
the other hand, increased by 3% one year after oil price shocks happened, as evidenced 
by Column 2 in Panel B. However, the estimate is imprecise and significant only at the 
90% confidence level.  38
Taken together, the results of this section suggest that the additional revenue generated 
by oil price shocks was reserved and invested during subsequent years. The larger 
resources were mainly invested in health, although there is some (imprecise) evidence of 
increased investment in the education sector as well. That lack of a (precise) effect of oil 
prices shocks on education investment might explain why the additional oil resources 
has no effects on children educational outcomes. However, it does not seem to be a 
satisfactory explanation for the small, but negative effects on primary school enrollment. 
The following section explores the role of violence in explaining this negative result. 
6.2. Oil price Shocks Fuel the Civil Conflict, by Increasing Paramilitary Violence 
This section provides evidence that suggests violence as a possible mechanism behind 
the small but negative effect of oil price shocks on primary school enrollment. To do so, 
the effect of oil price shocks on paramilitary violence is estimated, according to equation 
(2).  
Table 11 presents the results of this estimation and reveals that oil price shocks 
increased paramilitary violence in oil municipalities. As column (3) in the table shows, a 
rise in oil prices increased paramilitary attacks in areas that produce more oil. This 
 The evidence with regards to investment in the water sector is inconclusive, since contemporaneous oil 38
price shocks increased investment in this sector by 7%, but lagged shocks decreased it by 4%. Investment 
in transportation, on the other hand, decreased both in response to contemporaneous and lagged oil price 
shocks. The coefficients of total investment in Table 9 do not match exactly the coefficients of total 
investment in Table 8 because the tables use different databases. However, both tables display consistent 
signs and similar magnitudes. See the data section for more details regarding the databases used.
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result replicates Dube and Vargas (2013), who find that increases in oil prices fueled 
paramilitary violence in Colombia. 
To assess the magnitude of this effect, I calculate the average annual change in 
paramilitary attacks due to oil price increases, and find that paramilitary violence 
increased 8% per year, due to the rise in oil prices between 1998 and 2005. This number 
is calculated as follows: oil prices rose by 1.37 log points between 1998 and 2005. In the 
average oil producing municipality, with production levels of 0.084 hundred thousand 
barrels per day, this price increase translates into 0.08 more attacks over this 8 year 
period, compared with a municipality without oil. This, in turn, corresponds to 0.01 
more attacks per year, representing a 8% differential increase in paramilitary attacks 
above the mean (0.12). 
These results suggest that paramilitary violence could explain the negative effect of oil 
price shocks on primary school enrollment, because higher exposure to a civil conflict 
has been shown to negatively affect educational attainment (León, 2012; Akresh and de 
Walque, 2010; Akbulut-Yuksel, 2008; Chamarbagwala and Morán, 2011; Duque, 2014; 
Sánchez and Dominguez, 2012). Nonetheless, child labor could also be a mechanism, a 
matter that is addressed in the next subsection.  
6.3. The Effect of Oil Price Shocks on Local Labor Market Outcomes 
The previous section provided evidence that oil price increases fueled the civil conflict, 
which could explain the small but negative effects of higher oil prices on primary school 
enrollment. This section explores whether the effects on local labor markets could also 
explain this result, by estimating how wages and hours worked responded to exposure to 
oil price shocks. If the oil price increase would raise product demand and hence 
associated labor demand, it could affect school enrollment in two ways. On one hand, an 
increase in household welfare could raise investment in education, improving school 
enrollment. On the other hand, if the higher labor demand would incentivize child labor, 
students would be induced to drop out of school, therefore decreasing school enrollment. 
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This mechanism is explored using a separate database, the rural component of the 
National Household Survey (ENH is its acronym in Spanish) a household survey 
conducted in 23 of the 32 Colombian departments. The outcomes analyzed are hours 
worked during the past month, and well as hourly wages for wage and salary workers. 
The sample consists of employed individuals on official working age in Colombia, i.e. 
those between ages 14 and 60. Although the sample analyzed are mainly adults (as 
opposed to children) the results are informative about effects on the labor market that 
could affect child labor.  
Table 12 reports the effect of oil price shocks on hours worked and hourly wages. The 
results indicate that the effects are insignificant on both labor market outcomes. The 
coefficient for the number of hours worked (Column 2) is small, since it reveals that a 
1% increase in oil prices increases hours worked by 0.004% in the average oil 
municipality. This represents a 0.2% increase in hours worked per year given the 
increase in oil prices between 1998 and 2005. The coefficient for hourly wages, on the 
other hand, is medium sized, since it indicates that a 1% increase in oil prices generated 
a rise of 0.1% in hourly wages. This means that the increase in oil prices between 1998 
and 2005 increased wages by 3.9% per year.  
The (imprecise) effect of oil price shocks on hourly wages appears to be non-negligible. 
However, there are three factors that should be taken into account when interpreting 
this result. The first one is that the oil sector in Colombia is non-labor intensive and it 
uses specialized machinery that requires a workforce with specific skills to operate them. 
Therefore, higher oil production is unlikely to generate more demand for low-skilled 
labor, which is the type of effect that could induce children out of school and into the 
workforce. Second, the estimate on hourly wages is not statistically different from zero. 
Third, this estimate seems to be small when compared to the effect of price shocks on 
commodities that are labor intensive. Indeed, as Dube and Vargas (2013) show, a 1% 
increase in the price of coffee (a labor intensive sector), increased wages by 0.5% and 
number of hours worked by 0.43%, an effect that is at least 5 times higher than the 
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effect of oil price shocks. Taken together, these three factors seems to support the 
hypothesis that large effects on child labor are unlikely to explain the results. 
8. Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper investigates the effect of higher economic activity on educational outcomes in 
the context of Colombia, an oil producing country with a long-standing civil conflict. 
The higher economic activity studied takes the form of larger oil royalties, coming from 
increases in oil prices in international markets. The paper provides evidence showing 
that the increases in oil prices between 1998 and 2005 had limited effects on years of 
schooling or children’s grade for age. Even more surprising, oil price shocks had small 
but negative effects on primary school enrollment. These are puzzling results, because 
the additional oil resources should be spent in education, among other social sectors, as 
dictated by the Colombian law. The results indicate that the additional oil resources 
were saved and later invested primarily in the health sector, with no evidence of 
significant additional investments in the education sector. Furthermore, the evidence 
indicates that instead of fueling education, the higher oil revenue fueled the Colombian 
civil conflict. Indeed, the increased oil monetary transfers gave incentives to illegal right 
wing paramilitary groups to steal oil resources, resulting in an 8% increase in 
paramilitary violence in oil producing municipalities.  
The intensified paramilitary violence, which consisted mainly of civilian massacres, could 
have affected children’s education in several ways. Massacres spread fear amongst the 
population creating stress and anxiety, which has been shown to affect students’ 
behavior and performance (Sharkey et al., 2012, 2014; Bowen and Bowen 1999; Delaney-
Black 2002; Hurt et al. 2001). Paramilitary violence also generated massive forced 
displacement of families. The families lost their income and assets and their children 
were forced to leave school (Uwaifo and Wharton, 2013). Even if the length of the 
school leave was short, the adjustment to new settings could have been challenging, 
disrupting children’s school performance (Stermac et al., 2013). In addition, the quality 
of the education in high conflict regions might have decreased because high violent areas 
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attract less qualified teachers, which affects the education of those children who stay in 
high conflict zones (Grogger, 1997; Sánchez and Rodríguez, 2010). 
The evidence presented here reveals that the civil conflict might be an alternative 
explanation for the paradoxical negative effect of higher economic activity on primary 
education. Existing studies in civil-war free contexts have ascribed a bigger role to child 
labor, because higher local economic activity might increase the wages of low-skilled 
workers,  inducing children into employment and out of school. Some examples are 
Kruger (2007) and Duryea and Arends-Kuenning (2003), who study coffee price shocks 
and local labor market conditions in Brazil; or Black, McKinnish and Sanders (2005) 
and Cascio and Narayan (2015), who study coal price shocks or oil and gas extraction 
shocks in the US. Yet, when the higher economic activity happens in the context of a 
civil conflict, increased violence emerges as an alternative explanation for the 
paradoxical results.  
Indeed, this paper shows that the civil conflict is a more likely explanation that child 
labor, in the context of the Colombian oil sector. Although wages seem to have 
increased with oil prices, the increase is imprecisely estimated and substantively small, 
when compared to the wage increase generated by price shocks in commodities that, 
unlike oil, are labor intensive. Indeed, the estimates here presented are at least five 
times lower than the effect of higher coffee prices (a labor intensive sector), estimated by 
Dube and Vargas (2013).  
This paper has important policy implications for countries rich in natural resources 
(legally or illegally extracted), that are embedded in civil conflicts. The findings suggest 
that these countries could be harmed in the long run by economic shocks that favor 
them in the short run. Such is the case of Iran, Libya, Iraq or Qatar, which are big oil 
exporters and also have been affected by short or long term civil wars. Or the case of 
countries that produce or transport illegal drugs, since the profits from surges in illegal 
drug prices rarely benefit local residents and instead bring high levels of drug-cartel 
related violence (Angrist and Kugler, 2008). Such is the case of México, Guatemala, El 
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Salvador and Honduras. Education and welfare programs in these type of countries 
should target and monitor children who live or have lived in high conflict zones, to 
prevent losing valuable human capital for the long run development of countries.  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10. Figures and Tables 
Figure 1. Paramilitary attacks in oil municipalities increase with oil prices 
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Note: The sample consists on a balanced panel of 936 municipalities with paramilitary violence,
enrollment and public finance information in 1996-2005
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Figure 3. Paramilitary violence is also reflected in homicides 
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Figure 5. Social Expenditures do not seem to increase differentially in oil municipalities 
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Figure 7. The lifetime effect of oil price shocks on whether the child is behind grade 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of Children, by Oil Production 
VARIABLES Oil mun (2) Non-oil mun Diff
(1) (2) (3)
N. children 41,678 589,607
N. (grouped) municipalities 35 461
Attends school 0.795 0.805 -0.01***
(0.404) (0.396)
Behind grade for age (1) 0.360 0.354 0.01**
(0.480) (0.478)
N. years schooling 4.581 4.589 -0.01
(2.805) (2.890)
Ever exposed to a paramilitary attack (3) 0.746 0.582 0.16***
(0.435) (0.493)
N. paramilitary attacks exposed to (4) 9.580 3.791 5.79***
(14.706) (6.537)
Primary school age (7-11) 0.465 0.460 0.00*
(0.499) (0.498)
White 0.875 0.801 0.07***
(0.331) (0.400)
Black 0.065 0.110 -0.05***
(0.246) (0.313)
Indigenous 0.054 0.083 -0.03***
(0.227) (0.276)
Female 0.489 0.485 0.00*
(0.500) (0.500)
Head less than primary education 0.554 0.553 0.00
(0.497) (0.497)
Head primary educatrion 0.329 0.324 0.00*
(0.470) (0.468)
Head secondary education 0.095 0.099 -0.00***
(0.293) (0.299)
Head female 0.244 0.238 0.01***
(0.430) (0.426)
Household size 5.719 5.795 -0.08***
(2.328) (2.315)
Lives in urban area 0.570 0.498 0.07***
(0.495) (0.500)
Notes: Children in sample consist of individuals ages 7-17 in 2005 with non-missing control 
characteristics and who were born in municipalities with armed conflict information. (1) Behind 
grade takes 1 if the age minus the years of schooling of the child is 8 or more. (2) An oil 
municipality is a municipality that produced oil in 1988. (3) Ever exposed if the municipality where 
the child was born experienced a paramilitary attack during the child’s life. (4) N. paramilitary 
attacks the municipality of birth experienced during the child’s life
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Table 2. Summary Statistics of municipalities, by Oil Production 
VARIABLES All Oil mun Non-oil mun
Number of municipalities 936 38 898
Number of municipality x year observations 9360 380 8980
Municipality-year level variables
Paramilitary attacks 0.12 0.65 0.11
(0.52) (1.13) (0.47)
Paramilitary massacres 0.07 0.46 0.06
(0.37) (0.73) (0.34)
Enrollment rate 0.89 0.95 0.89
(0.19) (0.14) (0.19)
Primary enrollment rate (1) 1.23 1.27 1.23
(0.25) (0.22) (0.25)
Secondary enrollment rate (2) 0.58 0.54 0.58
(0.24) (0.17) (0.24)
Population - Million habitants 0.02 0.04 0.02
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Public transfers w/ mandatory destination 5,909 14,381 5,551
(includes oil revenue) - 2013 million pesos (4) (8,254) (16,134) (7,540)
Public social expenditures - 2013 million pesos 3,499 7,264 3,339
(6,172) (11,331) (5,802)
Municipality level variables
Ever had a paramilitary attack 1996-2005 0.36 0.66 0.35
(0.48) (0.48) (0.48)
Total paramilitary attacks 1996-2005 1.21 4.26 1.09
(2.82) (7.02) (2.42)
Ever had a paramilitary massacre 1996-2005 0.27 0.45 0.26
(0.44) (0.50) (0.44)
Total paramilitary massacres 1996-2005 0.69 2.11 0.63
(1.81) (4.34) (1.60)
Pct urban population 2005 0.41 0.50 0.41
(0.23) (0.20) (0.23)
NBI - Poverty Index 2005 52.55 56.13 52.40
(18.37) (14.41) (18.51)
Produced oil in 1988 0.04 1.00 0.00
(0.20) 0.00 0.00
Oil production in 1988 - hundred thsd barrels/day 0.00 0.08 0.00
(0.05) (0.26) 0.00
Year level variables
Oil price -Thsd 2013 pesos/barrel 76.01 76.01 76.01
(31.12) (31.12) (31.12)
Notes: The sample consists of a balanced panel of municipalities with information on school 
enrollment, paramilitary violence and other covariates for the period 1996-2005. (1) Primary 
enrollment defined as the N. students enrolled in primary as a pct of the N children 7-11 years old. 
(2) Secondary enrollment defined as the N. students enrolled in secondary as a pct of the N children 
12-17 years old. (3) This poverty index denotes the percentage of households in the municipality with 
their basic needs unsatisfied. (4) Denotes transfers from the national government to the municipality, 
that must be invested in specific sectors; includes transfers for the extraction of natural resources.
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Table 3. The limited effect of oil price shocks on school enrollment 
Dependent variable: Enrolled in school






Cumulative effect throughout (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lifetime -0.000328 -0.00210*** -0.000179
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Ages 0-6 -0.0318*** 0.0748 0.0303
(0.007) (0.046) (0.037)
Ages 7-11 -0.00761*** 0.00804 -0.0197
(0.002) (0.008) (0.030)
Ages 12-17 0.00194*** -0.00759
(0.001) (0.005)
Observations 631,285 631,285 290,416 290,416 340,869 340,869
R-squared 0.200 0.200 0.101 0.101 0.187 0.187
N. (grouped) municipalities 496 496 496 496 496 496
Note: Standard errors clustered at the municipality level. The sample consists of children ages 7-17 in 
2005, who were born in municipalities with oil production information available. The cumulative effect of 
oil price shocks is based on the estimated coefficient of oilprod88xlop at age k, which consists of the 
interaction of oil production in the municipality of birth (as of 1988) with log oil price when the child 
was age k. If the child had not achieved age k in 2005, this term takes zero. The term cumulative 
oilprod88xlop from ages i to j, consists of the sum of oilprod88xlop from age i to age j. The term 
cumulative oilprod88xlop during lifetime consists of the sum of oiprod88xlop over the child’s life. The 
regressions include child level controls, municipality and year fixed effects, time-varying municipality 
controls and region-specific linear time trends. Child level controls consist of gender, race/ethnicity 
indicators, head of the household education level (less than primary, primary, secondary), head of the 
household gender, household size and whether the household lives in an urban area. Municipality log- 
population by year included in the regressions. Region-specific linear time trends for each geographic 
region in Colombia (four in total) included, and for coca producing and non-producing census-units. 
Municipalities with less than 20,000 habitants are grouped with neighboring municipalities in the 2005 
census, forming census-units. There are a total of 538 census units, of which 496 are included in these 
regressions.
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Table 4. The limited effect of oil price shocks on whether the child is behind grade 
Dependent variable: Behind grade





Cumulative effect throughout (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lifetime -0.0007 0.0011 -0.00433***
(0.0006) (0.0015) (0.0009)
Ages 0-6 0.00889 0.0773** 0.108**
(0.008) (0.038) (0.049)
Ages 7-11 0.00163 0.0129** -0.0422
(0.002) (0.006) (0.029)
Ages 12-17 -0.00154** -0.0253***
(0.001) (0.004)
Observations 631,285 631,285 290,416 290,416 340,869 340,869
R-squared 0.280 0.280 0.176 0.176 0.203 0.203
N. (grouped) municipalities 496 496 496 496 496 496
Note: Standard errors clustered at the municipality level. The sample consists of children ages 7-17 in 
2005, who were born in municipalities with oil production information available. The cumulative effect of 
oil price shocks is based on the estimated coefficient of oilprod88xlop at age k, which consists of the 
interaction of oil production in the municipality of birth (as of 1988) with log oil price when the child 
was age k. If the child had not achieved age k in 2005, this term takes zero. The term cumulative 
oilprod88xlop from ages i to j, consists of the sum of oilprod88xlop from age i to age j. The term 
cumulative oilprod88xlop during lifetime consists of the sum of oiprod88xlop over the child’s life. The 
regressions include child level controls, municipality and year fixed effects, time-varying municipality 
controls and region-specific linear time trends. Child level controls consist of gender, race/ethnicity 
indicators, head of the household education level (less than primary, primary, secondary), head of the 
household gender, household size and whether the household lives in an urban area. Municipality log- 
population by year included in the regressions. Region-specific linear time trends for each geographic 
region in Colombia (four in total) included, and for coca producing and non-producing census-units. 
Municipalities with less than 20,000 habitants are grouped with neighboring municipalities in the 2005 
census, forming census-units. There are a total of 538 census units, of which 496 are included in these 
regressions. 
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Table 5. The small effect of oil price shocks on years of schooling 
Dependent variable: Years of schooling
Sample: Children age in 2005
7-17 7-11 12-17
Cumulative effect throughout (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lifetime 0.00297 0.00387 0.0194***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Ages 0-6 0.146*** 0.478*** -0.193
(0.023) (0.154) (0.270)
Ages 7-11 0.0195*** 0.0772*** 0.586**
(0.007) (0.024) (0.265)
Ages 12-17 -0.00316 0.141***
(0.005) (0.027)
Observations 631,285 631,285 290,416 290,416 340,869 340,869
R-squared 0.589 0.589 0.491 0.491 0.317 0.317
N. (grouped) municipalities 496 496 496 496 496 496
Note: Standard errors clustered at the municipality level. The sample consists of children ages 7-17 in 
2005, who were born in municipalities with oil production information available. The cumulative effect of 
oil price shocks is based on the estimated coefficient of oilprod88xlop at age k, which consists of the 
interaction of oil production in the municipality of birth (as of 1988) with log oil price when the child 
was age k. If the child had not achieved age k in 2005, this term takes zero. The term cumulative 
oilprod88xlop from ages i to j, consists of the sum of oilprod88xlop from age i to age j. The term 
cumulative oilprod88xlop during lifetime consists of the sum of oiprod88xlop over the child’s life. The 
regressions include child level controls, municipality and year fixed effects, time-varying municipality 
controls and region-specific linear time trends. Child level controls consist of gender, race/ethnicity 
indicators, head of the household education level (less than primary, primary, secondary), head of the 
household gender, household size and whether the household lives in an urban area. Municipality log- 
population by year included in the regressions. Region-specific linear time trends for each geographic 
region in Colombia (four in total) included, and for coca producing and non-producing census-units. 
Municipalities with less than 20,000 habitants are grouped with neighboring municipalities in the 2005 
census, forming census-units. There are a total of 538 census units, of which 496 are included in these 
regressions. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6. The small but negative effect of oil price shocks on primary school enrollment 
at the municipality level  
Dependent variable: Enrollment rate in primary school
OLS FE Linear Trends
(1) (2) (3)






Annual % change 98-05 -0.0024 -0.0024 -0.0014
Observations 9,360 9,360 9,360
R-squared 0.003 0.689 0.708
N. mun 936 936 936
Mun and year FE N Y Y
Mun*year controls and 
region linear trends
N N Y
Note: The sample consists on a balanced panel of municipalities with 
information on school enrollment, paramilitary violence and other 
covariates for the period 1996-2005. Municipality*year controls 
consist of log population, while region linear trends consist of linear 
trends for each geographic region in Colombia (four in total), and for 
coca producing and non-producing municipalities. Annual % change 
98-05=oilprod88xlop*avoilprod*dop/8, where avoilprod is the average 
oil production in oil municipalities (0.084 hundred thsd barrels/day), 
and dop is the change in log oil prices between 1998 and 2005 (1.37 
log points). It represents the average percentage change in the 
dependent variable (per year), due to the increase in oil prices 
between 1998 and 2005. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7. The effect of oil price shocks on secondary school enrollment at the 
municipality level 
Dependent variable: Enrollment rate in secondary school
OLS FE Linear Trends
(1) (2) (3)






Annual % change 98-05 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0004
Observations 9,360 9,360 9,360
R-squared 0.007 0.826 0.835
N. mun 936 936 936
Mun and year FE N Y Y
Mun*year controls and 
region linear trends
N N Y
Note: The sample consists on a balanced panel of municipalities with 
information on school enrollment, paramilitary violence and other 
covariates for the period 1996-2005. Municipality*year controls 
consist of log population, while region linear trends consist of linear 
trends for each geographic region in Colombia (four in total), and for 
coca producing and non-producing municipalities. Annual % change 
98-05=oilprod88xlop*avoilprod*dop/8, where avoilprod is the average 
oil production in oil municipalities (0.084 hundred thsd barrels/day), 
and dop is the change in log oil prices between 1998 and 2005 (1.37 
log points). It represents the average percentage change in the 
dependent variable (per year), due to the increase in oil prices 
between 1998 and 2005. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
oilprod88xlop(t) 23,908** -2952 26,860*** -3,170** -23,690***
(9947) (7866) (2982) (1371) (2666)
oilprod88xlop(t-1) -8,291*** 6,929*** -15,220*** 557 14,662***
(1882) (1573) (2973) (1528) (3160)
N. observations 9360 9360 9360 9360 9360
Rsquared 0.84 0.59 0.12 0.10 0.11
Notes: The sample consists of a balanced panel of municipalities with information on 
school enrollment, paramilitary violence and other covariates for the period 1996-2005. 
Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the municipality level. The regression 
includes municipality and year fixed effects; linear trends by geographic region (4 in total); 
linear trends for coca producing and non-producing municipalities; and log population.
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Table 9. The size of the effect of oil price shocks on revenue and expenditures 
Panel A. Effect of contemporaneous oil price shocks











(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Revenue 23,908** .040** 100%
(9,946) (0.016)
Gov. transfers w/ mandatory 
destination (include oil revenue)
23,837*** .058*** 77%
(5,986) (0.014)
Total Expenditures -2,952 -.004 100%
(7,866) (0.012)
Investment -3,206 -.007 76%
(5,974) (0.013)
Fixed capital accumulation -1,083 -.005 38%
(3,104) (0.015)
Social investment -2,123 -.008 38%
(2,922) (0.012)
Panel B. Effect of lagged oil price shocks










(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Revenue -8,290*** -.013*** 100%
(1,881) (0.003)
Gov. transfers w/ mandatory 
destination (include oil revenue)
-11,273*** -.027*** 77%
(2225) (0.005)
Total Expenditures 6,928*** .011*** 100%
(1,573) (0.002)
Investment 16,177*** .036*** 76%
(3,139) (0.007)
Fixed capital accumulation 5,093*** .025*** 38%
(946) (0.004)
Social investment 11,084*** .045*** 38%
(3,149) (0.013)
Notes: Each row represents a different regression. The sample consists of a balanced panel of municipalities 
with information on school enrollment, paramilitary violence and other covariates for the period 1996-2005. 
Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the municipality level. The regression includes municipality and 
year fixed effects; linear trends by geographic region (4 in total); linear trends for coca producing and non-
producing municipalities; and log population. Panel A presents the results for contemporaneous oil price 
shocks, while Panel B presents results for lagged oil price shocks. Column (1) reports the coefficient of the oil 
interaction term. Column (2)=(1)*avoilprod*dop/8, where avoilprod is the average oil production in oil 
municipalities (0.084 hundred thsd barrels/day), dop is the change in log oil prices between 1998 and 2005 
(1.37 log points). It represents the average percentage change in the dependent variable (per year) for the 
average oil municipality, due to increases in oil prices, assuming an increase in oil prices similar to the one 
between 1998 and 2005. Columns (3) and (4) displays the corresponding dependent variable as a percentage of 
total revenue (expenditures), for the average oil municipality.
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Table 10. Oil price shocks increased investment in health, but seemingly not in 
education  
Dependent variable              
(Million 2013 pesos)
Panel A. Effect of contemporaneous oil price 
shocks Pct Tot 
InvestmentCoefficient of 
oilprod88xlop (t)
Annual % change 
dep. var
(1) (2) (3)
Total investment 4,221 .008 100%
(5,834) (0.011)
Education -878 -.008 20%
(1,382) (0.012)
Health 1,617*** .011*** 26%
(278) (0.001)
Water and sewage 5,529*** .069*** 18%
(1,021) (0.012)
Transportation -1,628*** -.026*** 12%
(314) (0.005)
Dependent variable              
(Million 2013 pesos)
Panel B. Effect of lagged oil price shocks Pct Tot 
InvestmentCoefficient of 
oilprod88xlop (t-1)
Annual % change 
dep. var
(1) (2) (3)
Total investment 7,936*** .015*** 100%
(0.005)
Education 3,326* .030* 20%
(0.018)
Health 3,942*** .027*** 26%
(0.008)
Water and sewage -3,037** -.038** 18%
(0.016)
Transportation -1,379*** -.022*** 12%
(0.005)
Notes: Refer to notes on Table 9. 
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Table 11. Oil price shocks increased paramilitary violence in the oil region 
Dependent variable: Paramilitary attacks
OLS FE Linear trends
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3)






Av annual % change 0.099 0.099 0.086
Observations 9,360 9,360 9,360
Mun and year FE N Y Y
Mun*year controls and 
region linear trends
N N Y
Notes: The sample consists of a balanced panel of municipalities with 
information on school enrollment, paramilitary violence and other 
covariates for the period 1996-2005. Standard errors in parenthesis are 
clustered at the municipality level. Municipality*year controls consist of 
log population. Region linear trends refer to linear time trends specific 
to the four major geographic regions in Colombia and linear trends for 
coca producing and non-producing municipalities. The av. annual % 
change corresponds to the percent change in paramilitary attacks per 
year, due to the increase in oil prices between 1998 and 2005. This 
number is calculated by multiplying the estimated coefficient with the 
average oil production in oil municipalities (0.084 hundred thsd barrels/
day), the change in log oil prices between 1998 and 2005 (1.37 log 
points) and then dividing this number by the number of years in this 
period (8) and the average paramilitary attacks per year (0.12).
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Table 12. The Effect of Oil Price Shocks on Local Labor Markets 
Period: 1998-2005
Log wage Log hours
Dependent variable (1) (2)
oilprod88 x lop 1.254 0.049
(0.902) (0.310)
Elasticity av. oil mun 0.106 0.004
Annual % change 0.039 0.002
95% CI [-0.007 , 0.044] [-0.008 , 0.010]
Indiv*year obs. 25,405 55,836
R-squared 0.117 0.124
N. mun 240 240
Note: Standard errors clustered at the municipality level. The 
regression includes municipality and year fixed effects; linear 
trends by geographic region (4 in total); linear trends for coca 
producing and non-producing municipalities; and log population. 
The av. annual % change corresponds to the percent change in 
paramilitary attacks per year, due to the increase in oil prices 
between 1998 and 2005. This number is calculated by multiplying 
the estimated coefficient with the average oil production in oil 
municipalities (0.084 hundred thsd barrels/day), the change in 
log oil prices between 1998 and 2005 (1.37 log points) and then 
dividing this number by the number of years in this period (8).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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11. Appendix 
Table 13. Children in sample are representative of rural and small urban areas 
In sample
Out sample
No violence info Incompl covariates
VARIABLES Mean N Mean N Mean N
Attends school 0.80 631,285 0.90 197,405 0.73 44,412
Behind grade for age (1) 0.35 631,285 0.21 198,267 0.50 54,433
N. years schooling 4.59 631,285 5.08 197,507 4.02 47,530
Born in an oil municipality (2) 0.07 631,285 - 0 0.12 54,433
Ever exposed to a paramilitary attack (3)0.59 631,285 - 0 0.70 54,433
N. paramilitary attacks exposed to (4) 4.17 631,285 - 0 5.87 54,433
Primary school age (7-11) 0.46 631,285 0.48 198,267 0.49 54,433
White 0.81 631,285 0.88 198,267 0.51 54,433
Black 0.11 631,285 0.09 198,267 0.15 54,433
Indigenous 0.08 631,285 0.02 198,267 0.15 54,433
Female 0.48 631,285 0.49 198,267 0.48 54,433
Head less than primary education 0.55 631,285 0.25 182,039 0.75 5,894
Head primary educatrion 0.32 631,285 0.41 182,039 0.19 5,894
Head secondary education 0.10 631,285 0.23 182,039 0.05 5,894
Head female 0.24 631,285 0.27 198,267 0.08 54,433
Household size 5.79 631,285 4.83 198,267 4.88 54,433
Lives urban area 0.50 631,285 0.82 198,267 0.32 54,433
Notes: Children in sample consist of individuals ages 7-17 in 2005. Children out sample 
consist of children with i) incomplete information on control characteristics (covariates) 
or ii) children with no violence information. (1) Behind grade takes 1 if the age minus the 
years of schooling of the child is 8 or more. (2) An oil municipality is a municipality that 
produced oil in 1988. (3) Ever exposed if the municipality where the child was born 
experienced a paramilitary attack during the child’s life. (4) N. paramilitary attacks the 
municipality of birth experienced during the child’s life
!56




Incompl enroll No violence info
VARIABLES Mean N Mean N Mean N
Municipality level variables
Ever had a paramilitary attack 96-05 0.36 936 0.24 62 - -
Total paramilitary attacks 96-05 1.21 936 0.45 62 - -
Produced oil 1988 0.04 936 0.02 62 - -
Pct urban population 2005 0.41 936 0.25 62 0.49 92
Poverty index 2005 52.6 925 67.6 61 55.2 58
Area (m2) 766 936 4,870 62 1,302 92
Distance to capital (km) 126 925 196 61 115 58
Altitude (m) 1,220 925 858 61 699 58
Rainfall (mm) 1,863 925 2,228 61 2,045 58
Municipality-year level variables
Paramilitary attacks 0.12 9,360 0.05 620 - -
Population - Hundred habitants 21,812 9,171 7,497 620 202,493 902
Tax revenue 1996-2005 1,566 9,360 289 464 49,571 884
Coca production 2001-2006 0.08 4,680 0.25 310 0.10 655
Land gini 2000-2006 0.69 4,835 0.65 258 0.67 458
Primary enrollment rate (1) 1.23 9,360 1.12 551 1.04 752
Secondary enrollment rate (2) 0.58 9,360 0.40 457 0.52 697
Notes: Municipalities in sample consist of those with paramilitary violence information 
and complete school enrollment information. (1) Primary enrollment is measured as the 
number of children enrolled in primary divided by the number of children 7-11 in the 
municipality. (2) Secondary enrollment is measured as the number of children enrolled 
in secondary divided by the number of children 12-17 in the municipality.
!57
Table 15. Effect of oil price shocks on municipality revenue 
Dependent variable                        
(Million 2013 pesos)




Annual % change 
dep. var
(1) (2) (3)
Total Revenue (1)+(2) +(3) 23,908** .040** 100%
(9,946) (0.016)
Municipality revenue (1) 1,057 .007 15%
(4,445) (0.031)
Tax revenue 2,289 .021 11%
(4,075) (0.037)
Non-tax revenue -1,231*** -.036*** 5%
(424) (0.012)
Department transfers (2) 195*** .049*** 0%
(34) (0.008)
National transfers (3) 22,654*** .050*** 85%
(5,931) (0.013)
Discretionary Transfers -1,182*** -.026*** 8%
(106) (0.002)
Transfers with Mandatory 
destination (include oil revenue)
23,837*** .058*** 77%
(5,986) (0.014)
Dependent variable                
(Million 2013 pesos)





Annual % change 
dep. var
(1) (2) (3)
Total Revenue (1)+(2) +(3) -8,290*** -.013*** 100%
(1,881) (0.003)
Municipality revenue (1) 2,136 .015 15%
(1,478) (0.010)
Tax revenue 617 .005 11%
(1,091) (0.010)
Non-tax revenue 1,518*** .045*** 5%
(399) (0.011)
Department transfers (2) 35* .009* 0%
(20) (0.005)
National transfers (3) -10,462*** -.023*** 85%
(2,214) (0.004)
Discretionary Transfers 810*** .018*** 8%
(96) (0.002)
Transfers with Mandatory 
destination (include oil revenue)
-11,273*** -.027*** 77%
(2225) (0.005)
Notes: Refer to notes in Table 9.
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Table 16. Effect of oil price shocks on municipality expenditures 
Dependent variable              
(Million 2013 pesos)
Effect of contemporaneous oil 






Total expenditures (4)+(5)+(6) -2,952 -.004 100%
(7,866) (0.012)
Mun gov operations (4) 2,112 .014 22%
(1,914) (0.013)
Debt interest payment (5) -1,865** -.070** 2%
(877) (0.033)
Investment (6) -3,206 -.007 76%
(5,974) (0.013)
Fixed capital accumulation -1,083 -.005 38%
(3,104) (0.015)
Social investment -2,123 -.008 38%
(2,922) (0.012)
Dependent variable              
(Million 2013 pesos)






Total expenditures (4)+(5)+(6) 6,928*** .011*** 100%
(1,573) (0.002)
Mun gov operations (4) -4,992*** -.034*** 22%
(1,814) (0.012)
Debt interest payment (5) -4,272*** -.161*** 2%
(753) (0.028)
Investment (6) 16,177*** .036*** 76%
(3,139) (0.007)
Fixed capital accumulation 5,093*** .025*** 38%
(946) (0.004)
Social investment 11,084*** .045*** 38%
(3,149) (0.013)









Researchers and education practitioners have become increasingly interested on the 
relationship between education and students’ non-cognitive skills, such as grit, patience 
and having a growth-mindset. Understanding the development of these skills, however, 
has been restricted by the availability of objective and inexpensive measures for them. 
This paper proposes an objective and inexpensive proxy for non-cognitive skills, 
consisting of the incidence of skipping questions on a statewide standardized 
achievement test that has no penalties for guessing. The evidence suggests that skipping 
questions is likely to be related to a reduced level of non-cognitive skills. Conditional on 
test scores, skipping questions in middle school is related with worse educational 
outcomes in high school and college, such as increased grade repetition, high school 




Increasingly, the education and economics literature has been focusing on the role of 
non-cognitive skills in the school and economic performance of individuals. By non-
cognitive skills I mean grit, patience, motivation and a growth-mindset, among other 
traits different than intelligence. In line with the psychology literature, researchers in 
economics and education have found that these skills play an important role in 
individuals’ economic performance and in students’ education outcomes, in particular.  
Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz (2011) present a detailed review of the 
literature on this topic. The review describes how non-cognitive skills, measured 
according to the Big Five Personality Traits1, have been found to be related with more 
schooling (Goldberg et al. 1998; Eijck and De Graaf, 2004; Lleras, 2008), taking harder 
classes (Wong and Csikszentmihalyi, 1991), fewer school absences (Lounsbury et al. 
2004), graduating from high school (Baron and Cobb-Clark, 2010; Heckman, Stixrud 
and Urzua, 2006; Cunha, Heckman and Schenach, 2010) and getting higher grades 
(Poropat, 2009; Duckworth and Seligman, 2005; Duckworth et al. 2010). Furthermore, 
their review reveals how traits related with conscientiousness, like effortful control and 
attention, play an important role on predicting test scores (Blair and Razza, 2007; 
Valiente et al. 2010; Mischel, Shoda and Rodriguez, 1989; Ponitz et al. 2008; Duncan et 
al. 2007).  
To measure adult personality traits and non-cognitive skills, self-report measures are by 
far the most widely used (Almlund et al. 2011). One example of self-report measures is 
                                                
1 The Big Five Personality Traits are a taxonomy of traits that uses factor analysis of observer and self-
reports of behaviors. It summarizes personality on five broad components:  i) Openness to experience (the 
tendency to be open to new aesthetic, cultural, or intellectual experiences); ii) Conscientiousness (the 
tendency to be organized, responsible and hardworking); iii) Extraversion (orientation of interests and 
energies to the outer world of people and things, positive affect and sociability); iv) Agreeableness (act in 
a cooperative, unselfish manner); v) Neuroticism (the opposite of emotional stability, which is 
predictability and consistency in emotional reactions). 
 
 62 
the Grit Scale developed by Duckworth, Peterson, Matthews, and Kelly (2007) to 
measure perseverance and and passion for long-term goals. A second example are the 
questions, included in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), that measure 
respondents’ perception of their degree of control over lives (Rotter Locus of Control 
Scale) and their perception of self-worth (Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale). Despite the 
widespread use of self-reported measures, the evidence on their accuracy is mixed. For 
instance, in the case of motivation, self reports do not change when a behavioral award 
is removed, even though a response in behavior is indeed observed (Deci, Koestner and 
Ryan, 1999). On the other hand, self-reported motivation increases when it is expected 
to, such as when exam stakes are higher (Demars and Wise, 2005).  
Alternatives for self-reported measures are parent and teacher reports on a child’s 
observed behavior. For instance, the National Educational Longitudinal Survey (NELS), 
includes teacher reports on absenteeism, disruptiveness, inattentiveness, and tardiness. 
Another alternative for measuring non-cognitive skills are task measures, such as the 
number of seconds a child waits for a more preferred treat in a preschool test of delay of 
gratification (Mischel et al., 1989). Despite their value, observer reports or task 
measures can be very expensive for researchers because they may require altering 
established longitudinal surveys to include new questions or taking measures on the 
field. 
This paper proposes a new proxy for students’ non-cognitive skills, one that is low cost 
and objective, since it can be directly derived from students’ test taking behavior. The 
measure is the incidence of skipping questions on assessment examinations.  For this 
study, I measure the incidence of skipping questions by 7th and 8th grade students on a 
standardized statewide examination in Michigan. The Michigan Educational Assessment 
Program (MEAP), which is taken by 3rd to 8th grade students in Michigan public 
schools, possesses two characteristics that make skipping questions a suitable proxy for 
non-cognitive skills. First, the exam gives students the same score (zero) whether the 
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student answers the question incorrectly or leaves it unanswered. This means that 
students would be no worse off by guessing the answer (and getting the question right 
with 25% probability). Therefore, the incidence of skipping questions does not capture 
whether some students are strategic responders. Second, time is not a binding constraint 
in this exam, since schools are instructed to give students as much time as they need to 
finish the exam2 . Therefore, skipping is unlikely to capture slow answering, since 
students have ample time to guess at the last moment, if they want to do so.  
Previous research has found a relationship between nonresponse on surveys and non-
cognitive skills. For example, item non-response on survey items could reflect lower 
levels of both cognitive and non-cognitive skills, such as the understanding of the 
question, the care taken to answer it, the valuation of privacy or the willingness to share 
information with a stranger (Groves et al. 2009). In support of this argument, 
Hedengren and Stratmann (2012) find that item non-response in adult surveys is 
correlated with IQ and self-reported measures of conscientiousness and, furthermore, 
that this behavior is predictive of earnings and longevity. Similarly, Hitt, Trivitt and 
Cheng (2016) found that item nonresponse on student surveys are predictive of later 
educational attainment. 
Researchers have also found a relationship between willingness to answer questions on 
examinations and non-cognitive skills. For instance, Baldiga (2013) suggests that when 
there are penalties for guessing, the willingness to strategically guess on a high stakes 
exam could reflect confidence in knowledge of the material or risk aversion. Another 
example is Segal (2012), who shows that the coding speed test administered without 
                                                
2 Informal interviews with middle school educators in the Ann Arbor and Saline area revealed that schools 
vary in the way they give more time to students. Some schools establish longer exam durations, that go 
beyond the 1 hour suggested by the state of Michigan. In these cases, students who finish early must stay 
in their desks reading or doing any other activity in silence. Other schools maintain the standard 1 hour 
duration, but allow students to move to another room and continue answering the exam. The rest of the 
students who have already finished proceed with their regular class schedule. The interviews suggested 
that in these cases only a few students choose to move to another room and continue answering. 
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incentives to participants in the NLSY relates to intrinsic motivation and that it 
predicts future earnings. Torija (2012) suggests that correctly answering a very basic 
numeracy question in an international standardized test (counting dots in a graph) is a 
measure of willingness to answer. Similarly, Hitt (2015) shows that unpredictable or 
careless answering on student surveys predicts lower future educational attainment.  
Students’ decrease in performance over the course of an examination has also been 
associated with non-cognitive skills. According to Borghans and Schils (2012), when the 
order of questions is random (so questions do not increase in difficulty) the decline in 
performance during the test can be used to decompose test scores into cognitive and 
non-cognitive components. The authors show that this decline overall is related with 
conscientiousness and agreeableness and that it is correlated with future outcomes such 
as having a full-time job, academic qualification and smoking and drinking behavior.  
This paper contributes to this new literature in several ways. It proposes a proxy for 
non-cognitive skills that uses standardized achievement tests and rules out behaviors 
like strategic answering, since the MEAP test has no penalties for guessing. I show that 
this proxy captures traits other than intelligence, knowledge or speed in test taking. 
This is because time is not a binding constraint in the MEAP examination and the 
proxy is predictive of future educational outcomes, even after controlling for students’ 
test scores. In line with Borghans and Schils (2012), this paper proposes an inexpensive 
proxy for students’ non-cognitive skills that could be used in other standardized 
achievement tests with similar characteristics, in an era of expanded use of education 
administrative databases. In contrast with their work, it suggests a proxy that can be 
measured precisely at the student level3 and can be used even if the order of the 
questions in the exam is not random.  
                                                
3 The large standard errors in the regressions at the student level prevented these authors from estimating 
a measure of non-cognitive skills by student. 
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The incidence of skipping questions on a statewide standardized assessment examination 
could capture non-cognitive skills such as persistence with difficult questions, ability to 
focus, attention to instructions, intrinsic motivation with learning and/or disengagement 
with school or examinations. It is not possible to exactly identify which of these traits 
are captured by non-response. However, patterns observed in the data give some 
suggestions. Skipping does not seem to be related with age, which suggests that non-
response is not associated with non-cognitive skills that develop in a short-time frame 
(from the 7th to the 8th grade). Neither it is related with question number, suggesting 
that skipping does not capture the the ability to focus at the end of the exam. On the 
other hand, skipping does appear to be related with the difficulty of the question, which 
suggests that skipping is related with persistence when facing challenges, once academic 
ability is controlled for.   
Skipping questions in standardized exams constitutes an objective proxy for a bundle of 
non-cognitive skills that overcomes the weaknesses of self-report measures. It is also less 
costly since it does not require collecting observer reports or task measures in the field. 
This proxy could be used for research in other states or countries that have 
comprehensive education administrative databases, and that apply standardized tests 
with no additional penalties for answering a question incorrectly. Such is the case of 
standardized achievement tests applied in North Carolina and New York City. 
Moreover, this measure could be useful for detecting the mechanisms through which 
some educations interventions have effects on student achievement and behavior.  
I study the relationship between skipping questions and future educational outcomes 
using administrative data from the Michigan Department of Education and the National 
Student Clearinghouse. These data allow researchers to track students in Michigan from 
kindergarten through college and allows for the observation of all standardized exams 
students have taken from the 3rd to the 11th grade for each year the student is enrolled 
in a Michigan public school.  
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I find that, conditional on test scores (which control for students’ academic ability), the 
incidence of skipping questions in the 7th and 8th grade is consistently related to 
educational outcomes in high school and college. A student who skips multiple questions 
in one or more exams4 in the 7th and 8th grades is about six percentage points less 
likely to graduate on-time from high school, two percentage points more likely to drop 
out of school, three percentage points more likely to repeat grades in high school and 
two percentage points less likely to enroll in a any type of college, relative to a 
comparable student who did not skip any questions in 7th or 8th grade. These results are 
robust to the definition of skipping incidence or to the measurement of cognitive ability 
as captured by test scores. This evidence suggests that the incidence of skipping 
questions in exams serves as a proxy for traits that are not related with intelligence or 
knowledge, which are likely to be non-cognitive skills5. 
2. Methodology 
The objective of this paper is to study the relationship between the incidence of 
skipping questions in exams and future educational outcomes. I accomplish this by 
estimating OLS models with several measures of educational attainment in the left hand 
side and the incidence of skipping questions in the right hand side, together with other 
covariates. 
Specifically, I estimate the equation 
 
                                                
4 Students enrolled in grades 7 and 8 during this period are expected to take 5 assessment exams, 
described in further detail later. 
5 Even though it would be interesting to use this proxy to target children for supports, I found that the 
proxy does not explain a significant fraction of the variation in educational outcomes, beyond the 
standard socio-demographic characteristics. 
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Where  denotes the educational outcome of student i in school j,  is a vector of 
measures for the student’s incidence of skipping in grades 7th and 8th,  is a 
quadratic function of average test scores in all exams taken in 7th and 8th grades, and  
is a vector of covariates, which includes student demographic and school characteristics.  
The educational outcomes consist of several measures observed in high school and 
college. In high school I estimate the probability of grade repetition, dropping out, and 
on-time high school graduation 6  as well as predictive performance on high school 
standardized exams (MME and ACT). For college outcomes, I consider enrollment in 
college one year after expected on-time high-school graduation7 in any postsecondary 
institution, as well as specific 4-year or 2-year college enrollment.  
The main variable of analysis, , is a vector of indicators that assigns a student to 
one of three mutually exclusive groups according to the severity of his skipping 
behavior. The first indicator is skipping only one question on exactly one exam, which is 
the least severe group. The second is skipping multiple questions on exactly one exam, 
and the third, and most severe measure, is skipping questions in multiple exams. This 
the most severe measure because it represents persistence on skipping behavior. This 
measure is also less likely to reflect a student who had a single “bad day”. The excluded 
category is thus the group of students who never skip a single question on any exam. 
One critical component of the equation above is the inclusion of the function of average 
test scores, which is incorporated to control for academic ability. This is a key aspect of 
the analysis because the students who skip questions could be precisely those with lower 
                                                
6 For the analysis sample (2006 7th grade cohort), a student with a normal grade progression would have 
started the 9th grade in the 2007-2008 academic year and graduated on-time by the 2010-2011 academic 
year.  “On time” is reflective of the academic year in which a student begins the 9th grade, so a student 
could still graduate on time even if he repeated the 7th or 8th grade. 
7 For a student with a normal grade progression in the cohort analyzed, this means enrolling in college 
any time in the 2011-2012 academic year.  
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levels of intelligence or academic knowledge, since a student who knows how to answer a 
question would be unlikely to skip that question.  
In order to isolate this confounding factor, I control for the average test scores that 
students received in all exams taken in the 7th and 8th grades. Although test scores are 
not a perfect measure of cognitive skills, they have been largely used in the literature to 
measure academic ability. By controlling for test scores, the coefficient on the incidence 
of skipping would reflect the importance of traits different than intelligence and 
academic knowledge, as for example, non-cognitive skills.  
Controlling for test scores is equivalent to finding a comparable student whose academic 
ability is equivalent to the skipper’s. However, controlling for actual test scores might 
understate the academic ability of the student who skips. This is because he receives 
zero points for the questions he skips, which assumes that he would have gotten the 
question wrong had he answered it. Therefore, it is necessary to adjust the test scores to 
account for this. 
I adjust the standardized scores by simulating additional scenarios, had the student 
answered the question. The student could have at least guessed randomly and gotten 
the right answer with 25% probability.8 Alternatively, he could have made an educated 
guess by eliminating incorrect answers, which is probably related to the rate at which he 
got the rest of the exam correct (e.g. a student who got 75% of the rest of the test 
correct may make better educated guesses than a student who got 25% of the rest of the 
exam correct). I modify test scores by adjusting skippers’ proportion of correct answers 
and then translating these adjusted percentages into alternative standardized test 
scores.  
                                                




The adjustment of the percentage of correct answers is performed in three different 
ways: (i) increasing the number of correct answers assuming that the student randomly 
guessed the answer (e.g., increasing the number of correct answers by 0.25 for each 
skipped question); (ii) increasing the number of correct answers by the rate at which the 
student got correct the questions he attempted (e.g. if he got right 60% of the questions 
he did not skip, I increase the number of correct answers by 0.6 for each skipped 
question); and (iii) assuming every skipped question would have been answered correctly 
(e.g. increasing the number of correct answers by 1 for each skipped question). I believe 
that student’s true academic ability lies somewhere between scenarios (i) and (ii). 
However, I provide results for scenario (iii) to present an upper bound for the estimates.  
Each of the three adjustments to the percentage of correct answers is then used to 
create an alternative standardized scaled score. The alternative scores are created using 
non-skippers’ information, since the specific function that maps percentage of correct 
questions into scaled test scores is unknown. I estimate the alternative scores by first 
regressing standardized scaled scores on the percentage of correct answers for the 
students who do not skip questions.  Then, I use the estimated coefficients to make two 
out-of-sample predictions for skippers’ standardized scaled scores, one using the adjusted 
percentage of correct answers and one using the unadjusted. The difference between the 
two predicted scores is then added to the actual standardized scaled score and, as a 
result, there are three final adjusted standardized scale scores, one for each way of 
adjusting the percentage of correct answers (options (i) to (iii) above).  
Finally, I include other covariates in the regression, such as students’ race, gender, 
poverty status (as measured by ever been eligible for free/reduced price lunch), age and 
participation in special education and limited English proficiency programs. I also 
include fixed effects for the school where the student was in the 7th and 9th grade. This 
set of covariates is added one by one, in order to identify how sensitive the coefficient of 




The data for this study come from the Michigan Department of Education (MDE) and 
the Center for Educational Performance and Information (CEPI) at the State of 
Michigan. Several sources of cross-sectional MDE and CEPI administrative databases 
were joined together to form a longitudinal student database for the 2006 cohort of first-
time 7th grade students. This longitudinal database tracks students forward with 
respect to their school enrollment, achievement scores, high school graduation and 
college attendance.    
The CEPI administrative data includes the Michigan Student Data System (MSDS), 
which provides information on student demographics such as race, gender, free/reduced 
price lunch eligibility (a measure of poverty status) and students’ final exit status. The 
exit status allows us to identify the standing of the student the last time he was seen in 
the administrative data system. Specifically, the exit status reports if the student 
graduated from high school, moved out of state or to a private school, dropped out to 
obtain a GED, among others. The MSDS also identifies if the student was in a special 
education or limited English proficiency program. 
The MDE data includes two sources of assessment information. The first one is the 
Michigan Educational Assessment Program (MEAP), which provides test scores data for 
grades 3-8 between 2004-2012. The MEAP test is administered in various grade-subject 
combinations. Not all subjects are tested in each grade and, within a grade, testing of 
some subjects started later in that period. For instance, math and reading are assessed 
every year, while science is only assessed in grades 5 and 8. Also, math was only 
initiated for testing in the 7th grade in the 2006 academic year. The second assessment 
database is the Michigan Merit Examination (MME) database, which provides 
assessment data for 11th grade students in subjects such as mathematics, English, 
reading and science, among others. The MME also includes a full ACT component, 
which is the college entrance exam applied in the state of Michigan, equivalent to the 
 
 71 
SAT.9 Since ACT testing became mandatory (and free) in Michigan public high schools 
in 2007, all students in the analysis sample were expected to take the ACT when 
reaching the 11th grade.10 
The MDE and CEPI administrative data was supplemented with postsecondary 
enrollment and retention information obtained from the National Student Clearinghouse 
(NSC). The NSC tracks students’ college enrollment, including the type of institution he 
was enrolled in (public, private, 4-year or 2-year). The NSC data also allows measuring 
persistence, since it identifies how long students were enrolled in college. 
Measuring skipping and education outcomes 
The proxy for non-cognitive skills - the incidence of skipping behavior on assessment 
exams – comes from the MEAP examination database.  The MEAP test includes two 
variables with the necessary information to determine if a question was skipped. The 
first variable is the string of question answers, which records the responses that students 
marked (A to D) or a blank if no answer was provided. The second variable is the string 
of scored question answers, which consists of 0s and 1s, 1s for all questions correctly 
answered and 0s for all questions incorrectly answered or left blank. A skipped question, 
therefore, is an item that has a blank on the string of answers and a zero on the string 
of scored answers11.  
                                                
9 Questions left blank in the ACT do not receive the same score than incorrect questions. For this reason, 
the ACT exam is not used to construct the skipping measure. Instead, the ACT scores are used to assess 
the relationship between skipping questions in middle school exams and high school achievement. 
10 More detailed information about the structure and background of the data sources can be found in 
Dynarski, Frank, Jacob and Schneider (2013). 
11 Both the string of answers and the scored string of answers are needed to identify skipped questions, 
because of the existence of field items. Field items are new questions included in the exam that are being 
tested and therefore do not count towards the final score. Field items are registered in the string of 
answers as blanks. I can distinguish field items from skipped questions, because field items have a blank 
on the string of scored answers, while skipped questions have a zero. 
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I am interested in measuring the relation between the incidence of skipping in 
assessment examinations during middle school and future educational outcomes. The 
outcomes of interest are on-time high school graduation (4 years after starting 9th 
grade), delayed high school graduation (5 years after), grade repetition, performance in 
high school standardized examinations, together with college enrollment. In order to 
measure the relation between skipping behavior and future high school and college 
outcomes, it is necessary to identify skipping behaviors before students enter to high 
school (in middle school, for example) and following them into high school and college. 
To accomplish this, I measure the incidence of skipping questions in middle school, 
when students were in the 7th and 8th grades. 
Students in the 7th and 8th grades could have skipped questions in up to 5 exams, since 
they take math and reading examinations in both grades and science in the 8th grade 
only. On average, the math test consist of 60 questions and the reading test consists of 
30 questions.12 
Sample 
The analysis sample for this study consists of the cohorts of students who were first-
time 7th graders in Michigan public schools in 2006 through 200913. I restricted the 
sample to students who were enrolled in Michigan public schools through at least the 
ninth grade, so I could analyze their education outcomes in high school. These cohorts 
were chosen first to maximize middle-school test taking, since the 7th grade math test 
was first offered in 2006, and second, to follow students through college, given that the 
2008-2009 7th grade cohort could be in first year of college by 2015.  
                                                
12 The number of questions in a test varies by grade and year. For instance, the math test has between 52 
and 66 questions in the 7th grade and between 41 and 60 questions on the 8th grade. 




I exclude students who moved out of the state, or transferred to private schools or home 
schooling, since I cannot track them once they exit the system. I also exclude students 
in non-regular schools or in schools with less than 10 students per cohort. Finally, I 
exclude students with missing scores in any of the five exams taken during middle 
school. These students are excluded because they have less opportunities to skip 
questions in exams and, therefore, their  skipping rate might be underestimated.14 This 
leaves us with 381,421 unique students included in the estimation sample. Henceforth, I 
will call the analysis sample the 2006-2009 7th grade cohorts, where the year corresponds 
to the calendar year when the spring semester took place. 
4. Summary Statistics 
Skipping questions on standardized exams is a behavior characteristic of a small 
percentage of the population of students. As Table 17 shows, 16% of the students skip at 
least one question in one exam (Columns 3 through 5). Of these, a third correspond to 
students skipping at higher frequencies, equally divided between those who skip multiple 
questions in a single exam (Column 4) and those who skip in multiple exams (Column 
5). The remainder skip only one question on a single exam during the 7th and 8th 
grades (Column 3). 
What are the characteristics of the students who skip? Skipping even one question in 
one examination (out of five) provides meaningful separation from students who never 
skip. As Panel A in Table 18 shows, the group of students skipping exactly one question 
is more likely to be black than the group who never skips (24% vs. 14%), be eligible for 
free or reduced lunch (60% vs. 47%) and belong to a special education program (15% vs. 
10%). Further, this group performs worse in middle school standardized achievement 
                                                
14 Table A.1. in the appendix compares the characteristics of students who miss one or more middle school 
exams (out-sample) with students who do not miss exams (in-sample). The Table reveals that those 
students who miss exams belong to disadvantaged groups at higher rates and perform almost one 
standard deviation below the mean in standardized achievement tests. Missing school exams itself could 
also reflect low levels of non-cognitive skills, but I turn aside it to focus only on the skipping behavior. 
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tests. For instance, those who skip one question perform -0.3 standard deviations (sd) 
below the mean, compared to those who never skip, who perform +0.09 above the 
mean.15  
Consistent with the patterns observed in middle school examinations, skippers’ also 
have worse educational outcomes in high school and college. According to Panel B, 
those who skip one question perform -0.33 sd below the mean on the ACT, compared to 
+0.06 sd above the mean for never skippers. They also repeat high school grades at 
higher rates (16% vs. 10%),  take longer to graduate from high school (9% still enrolled 
in HS 5 years after starting vs. 6%) and enroll in college at lower rates (54% vs. 65%). 
These differences between skippers and non-skippers are stronger when the incidence of 
skipping questions increases (Columns 4 and 5).  
Since the characteristics that separate skippers from non-skippers are likely to be 
correlated, I perform a regression analysis to predict skipping, including all the 
mentioned characteristics as covariates. As Table 19 shows, race/ethnicity and student 
academic performance have the highest explanatory power. An African-American 
student is between one and four percentage points more likely to skip questions, 
depending on the measure of skipping considered. A student who scores one standard 
deviation above the mean on middle school examinations is between 2 and 4 percentage 
points less likely to skip questions, all other things equal. Including all the 
characteristics as covariates decreases the correlation of skipping with poverty and 
special education status. For instance, controlling for race and academic achievement, 
                                                




free/reduced lunch and special education students are only about one percentage points 
more likely to skip questions.16 
Surprisingly, I did not find strong evidence of males skipping at higher rates than 
females. Females are only one percentage point less likely to skip one question (Column 
1), and 0.04 percentage points less likely to skip two or more questions (Columns 2 and 
3). Since the literature suggests that the higher educational achievement of females is 
partially explained by differences in non-cognitive skills (Jacob, 2002; Cornwell, Mustard 
and Van Parys, 2013), this suggests that the non-cognitive skills associated with 
skipping questions in standardized exams might not be gender specific. 
What could skipping measure? 
Observed patterns in the data suggest that skipping does not capture traits specific to a 
particular age, since students in the 7th grade skip questions at the same rate than 
students in the 8th grade (Figure 9).  
Skipping is related to the subject evaluated. As Figure 9 reveals, students are almost 
two times more likely to skip questions in math exams (5%) than in reading exams 
(3%). The majority of them skip one question, but a non-negligible portion skips two or 
more questions. For example, out of the 5% of students who skip questions in the math 
exam on 7th grade, a quarter skip two or more questions.  
In addition, skipping is related to the difficulty of the question, as pupils tend to skip 
questions that other pupils get incorrect.17 As Figure 10 and 11 show, there is a positive 
relationship between the percentage of 7th grade students that answer incorrectly a math  
or reading question and the percentage who skip it. This positive relationship between 
                                                
16 This regression also suggests that skippers are more likely to be Asians and Hispanics. However, Table 
1 reveals that the representation of these races/ethnicities is very small in the sample, so I prefer to 
disregard these significant differences in skipping. 
17 The percentage of students who answer incorrectly does not include those who skip 
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difficulty and skipping reinforces the importance of controlling for overall test taking 
performance. Once test scores are controlled for, this relationship could suggest that 
skipping behavior captures lack of perseverance when the student faces challenges.  
Finally, there is mixed evidence on whether skipping captures tiredness at the end of the 
test. Figure 12 and 13 illustrate how the percentage of students who skip a question 
relates to the question number (or question order). While pupils skip more questions at 
the end of the reading exam, the same does not happen in the math exam, which is the 
subject with higher skipping incidence. 
5. Results 
The objective of this paper is to study the relationship between the incidence of 
skipping questions on standardized statewide examinations and future educational 
outcomes. As it was stated in section 3, I accomplish this by running OLS regressions 
with future educational outcomes on the left hand side and skipping incidence on the 
right hand side, together with other covariates.  
Table 20 presents the results of the regressions for on-time high school graduation (e.g. 
graduating after 4 years of first entering the 9th grade). The model is built up by slowly 
adding the different sets of covariates. It starts with column 1, which includes only 
demographic variables as explanatory variables. This column confirms a well-established 
fact in the literature, that black and male students are less likely to graduate on-time 
from high school. However, when academic ability is added in column 2 (with a 
quadratic on random-guessing adjusted test scores), the coefficients in column 1 change 
dramatically. Conditional on cognitive skills, black students are more likely to graduate 
on-time from high school, confirming the findings in Cameron and Heckman (2001). The 
same is true for special education students.  
Column 3 adds the main variable of interest, which is the incidence of skipping in 
exams. This variable is included by adding a set of indicators which define mutually 
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exclusive groups of skippers: those who skipped exactly one question in one exam, those 
who skipped multiple questions in exactly one exam, and those who skipped at least one 
question on multiple exams, which I consider to be the most severe measure of skipping. 
The omitted category consists on the group of students who do not skip a single 
question on any of the baseline examinations18.  
The coefficients on the skipping indicators are negative, statistically significant and have 
meaningful magnitudes. For instance, a student who skips only one question in one 
exam is 2.4 percentage points less likely to graduate on-time from high school than an 
observationally similar student who does not skip any question. The relationship gets 
stronger as the severity of skipping increases; a student who skips several questions in 
one exam is 4.6 less likely to graduate on-time than a non-skipper, while a student who 
skips at least one question on multiple exams is 6.9 percentage points less likely to do 
so.  
The inclusion of the skipping indicators has negligible effects on the coefficients of other 
covariates, which suggests that skipping captures variation that was formerly embedded 
in the error term. This, however, does not imply that skipping adds explanatory power 
to the prediction of on-time high school graduation, since the R-squared does not change 
significantly when adding this variable. 
Finally, columns 4 and 5 add cohort and 7th grade-school fixed effects. The results are 
largely unchanged by the inclusion of these fixed effects, which suggests that the 
relationship between skipping and graduation does not arise from specific school 
practices or resources, but it rather comes from differences between individual students.   
                                                
18 The incidence of skipping was also added using continuous measures of non-response, such us the 
percentage of questions skipped and the percentage of exams/years when the student skipped. The results, 
not presented here, are qualitatively the same and are available in the appendix/upon request. 
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In Table 20 I control for cognitive skills using the random-guessing adjusted test scores. 
This adjustment assumes that if the student had answered the questions he skipped, he 
would have gotten them right at random. As mentioned in section 3, other alternatives 
to control for academic ability include using actual test scores, using percent-correct 
adjusted test scores (e.g. assuming she would have gotten skipped questions right at the 
same rate she got right the rest of the exam) and all-correct adjusted scores (e.g. 
assuming she would answered skipped questions right). For comparison purposes, Table 
21 presents the results with these alternative adjustments. The table displays the 
estimated coefficients on the skipped indicators for each adjustment, using the preferred 
specification, which is column (5) in Table 20. 
As I move through the different adjustments (from column 1 – actual test scores, to 
column 4 – all-correct adjusted test scores), the estimated coefficients get higher in 
magnitude and more significant. For example, a student who skipped multiple questions 
in exactly one exam is 4.6 percentage points less likely to graduate from high school on-
time, when actual test scores are controlled for. The coefficient increases to 5.2 
percentage points if I control for random-guessing adjusted scores, to 5.8 percentage 
points if I control for the percent-correct adjusted scores and to 7 percentage points if I 
control for all-correct adjusted scores (column 4). This increase in the magnitude of he 
coefficient is natural, because the adjustments correct any under-estimation of skippers 
academic ability, which implies comparing them with students of higher academic 
ability. Among these options, the preferred is random-guessing adjusted test scores, 
because it constitutes a middle point between assuming that the skipper would have 
gotten all the skipped questions wrong or all of them right.  
Having presented the results for on-time high school graduation with different test 
scores adjustments, Table 22 proceeds to summarize the results for the rest of the 
outcomes. The outcomes, displayed in the columns, include grade repetition in high 
school, continued enrollment after 4-years of starting the 9th grade, college enrollment 
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and performance in high school standardized examinations. In this table I control for 
academic ability using random-guessing adjusted test scores. The results do not change 
using optional adjustments for test scores. 
Table 22 shows that a student who skips questions in exams is more likely to repeat 
grades in high school, at rates that range from 1.6 and 3.6 percentage points, depending 
on the incidence of skipping considered. Consistently, this student is more likely to still 
be enrolled in high school after 4 years of starting the 9th grade. Furthermore, this 
student is less likely to enroll in any type of college, at rates that range from 1.4 and 2.7 
percentage points.  
These results are all qualitatively the same and the magnitudes and significance of the 
coefficients reinforce the relationship between skipping and future educational outcomes. 
One exception, however, is the performance on high school examinations, since the 
evidence for these outcomes depends on the subject considered. Skippers perform worse 
in math exams regardless of the skipping incidence, from 0.03 to 0.05 standard 
deviations below non-skippers, which is consistent with the previous results. In contrast, 
students who skip multiple questions in exactly one exam (row 2) have higher reading 
test scores. These results are intriguing and encourage digging in further in the role of 
skipping questions in reading examinations in particular. 
6. Conclusions 
The incidence of skipping questions on standardized examinations in Michigan is related 
to reduced rates of on-time high school graduation, increased high school drop-out and 
repetition rates, and reduced rates of college enrollment.  This relationship holds under 
a wide range of model specifications, different controls for baseline academic 
achievement, and definitions of the variable of interest. Further, more severe definitions 
of skipping incidence are related to more severe educational outcomes. 
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In this Michigan examination, there are no penalties for guessing, the test is multiple 
choice, and students are not bound by a time constraint.  Thus, students are always 
weakly better off guessing than leaving questions blank and should not be constrained 
by time or ability from doing so.  Further, even if there was an effective time constraint 
(students wishing not to take the “extra time” they are given), it would take them only 
minimal effort to fill in the blanks randomly at the end of the exam.  This structure of 
the exam, combined with our controls for baseline test scores, lead us to believe skipping 
incidence is capturing something different than intelligence and academic ability, 
unobserved non-cognitive skills which are important for academic success.  
Surprisingly, I did not find strong evidence of males skipping at higher rates than 
females. Females are only 1 percent point less likely to skip only 1 question (Columns 
1), and 0.04 percent points less likely to skip 2 or more questions, compared to males 
(Columns 2 and 3). Although the literature suggests that the higher educational 
achievement of females is partially explained by differences in non-cognitive skills 
(Jacob, 2002; Cornwell, Mustard and Van Parys, 2013), I find that females are only 
0.8% less likely to skip questions. This suggests that the non-cognitive skills associated 
with skipping questions in standardized exams are not gender specific. 
This paper has proposed a low-cost objective measure of non-cognitive skills that may 
allow us to get at mechanisms through which other programs work to increase overall 
test scores, which makes a good starting point for additional research to identify which 
non-cognitive skills are important to academic success. 
This study does have the limitation of increasing only slightly the R-squared statistic, 
when the skipping incidence is included as a predictor of educational outcomes. As a 
result, skipping does not help to better identify students who are at risk of dropping out 
from high school, which would be useful for schools and policy-makers. More research is 
needed to identify if there exists a population of students for which skipping incidence 
does add predictive value. 
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In addition, it is difficult to untangle the bundle of non-cognitive skills skipping 
incidence may represent: for example, perseverance, motivation, attention to 
instructions, competitiveness, or composure.  Fortunately, the availability of rich 
administrative databases allows for a deeper investigation into student test taking than 
just a simple observation of the final score.  Patterns of answers and non-response may 
offer opportunities for researchers to develop a richer understanding of the relationship 
between test taking and future academic achievement. 
The measure here proposed should not be used for accountability purposes, or to target 
education policies or evaluate programs that intent to boost non-cognitive skills. This is 
because it could incentivize practitioners to make sure students do not leave questions 
blank in standardized exams. This would cause an immediate decrease in skipping 
incidence, without an underlying improvement on students non-cognitive skills. Rather, 
this measure serves as an example of serious behaviors that can be predicted from minor 
behaviors, opening an entire avenue for research in the topic of non-cognitive skills.  
One area of future research is to identify which non-cognitive skills are dominant or 
lacking through patterns of skipping behavior.  For example, skipping difficult questions 
might reflect a lack of perseverance or composure.  On the other hand, skipping a string 
of questions at the end of the exam may reflect a lack of competitiveness or poor 
attention to directions as these students easily could have filled in answers randomly in 
the final minute of the examination.  Once identified, researchers could test whether 
some of these non-cognitive skills are more or less related to future academic success or 
whether some behaviors are more or less persistent across examinations. Further, 
applying measures of non-cognitive skills on the field using standard psychological 
metrics, would allow to study how skipping incidence relates to this measures and, 
therefore, which non-cognitive skills is it likely to apply. Finally, explicit models of test 





ALMLUND, M., DUCKWORTH, A., HECKMAN, J. AND KAUTZ, T. (2011). “Personality 
Psychology and Economics” in Handbook of the Economics of Education, Vol. 4.  
BALDIGA, D. (2013). “Gender Differences in Willingness to Guess”. Management Science 
560(2): 434-448 
BÁRON, J.D., COBB-CLARK, D.A. (2010) “Are Young People’s Educational Outcomes 
Linked to Their Sense of Control?” IZA Discussion Paper No. 4907. 
BLAIR, C., RAZZA, R.P. (2007). “Relating Effortful Control, Executive Function, and 
False Belief Understanding to Emerging Math and Literacy Ability in Kindergarten”. 
Child Dev. 78(2), 647–663. 
BORGHANS, L. AND SCHILS, T. (2012). “The Leaning Tower of Pisa: Decomposing 
Achievement Test Scores into Cognitive and Noncognitive Components.” Paper 
presented at the 2012 NBER Summer Institute in Education Economics, Cambridge. 
CAMERON, S. AND HECKMAN, J. (2001). “The Dynamics of Educational Attainment for 
Black, Hispanic and White Males.” Journal of Political Economy, 109 (3), 455-499. 
CORNWELL, C., MUSTARD, D. AND VAN PARYS, J. (2013). “Noncognitive Skills and the 
Gender Disparities in Test Scores and Teacher Assessments Evidence from Primary 
School.” Journal of Human Resources, 48 (1), 236-264. 
CUNHA, F., HECKMAN, J.J., SCHENNACH, S.M. (2010) “Estimating the Technology of 
Cognitive and Noncognitive Skill Formation.” Econometrica 78(3), 883–931. 
DECI, E., KOESTNER, R. AND RYAN, R. (1999) “A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments 
Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation.” Psychological 
Bulletin, 125 (6), 627-668. 
DEMARS, C.E. & WISE, S.L. (2005). “Low examinee effort in low-stakes assessment: 
Problems and potential solutions.” Educational Assessment 10, 1-17. 
DUCKWORTH, A. L., PETERSON, C., MATTHEWS, M. D. AND KELLY, D. R. (2007) “Grit: 
Perseverance and passion for long-term goals.” Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology., 92: 1087–1101 
DUCKWORTH, A.L., SELIGMAN, M.E.P. (2005) “Self-Discipline Out does IQ in Predicting 
Academic Performance of Adolescents.” Psychol.Sci. 16(12), 939–944. 
DUCKWORTH, A.L., TSUKAYAMA, E., MAY, H. (2010) “Establishing Causality Using 
Longitudinal Hierarchical Linear Modeling: An Illustration Predicting Achievement” 
Self-Control. Soc. Psychol. Personal. Sci. 1(4), 311–317. 
 
 83 
DUNCAN, G.J., DOWSETT, C.J., CLAESSENS, A., MUGNUSON, K., HUSTON, A.C., 
KLEBANOV, P., PAGANI, L.S., FEINSTEIN, L., ENGEL, M., BROOKS-GUNN, J., SEXTON, H., 
DUCKWORTH, K., JAPEL, C. (2007) “School Readiness and Later Achievement.” Dev. 
Psychol. 43(6), 1428–1446. 
DYNARSKI, S., FRANK, K., JACOB, B., SCHNEIDER, B. (2013) “Does Raising Standards 
Raise Achievement: Early Impacts of Michigan’s College Prep High School Curriculum”. 
Unpublished Manuscript. 
EIJCK, V. AND DE GRAAF, P.(2004). “The big five at school: The impact of personality 
on educational attainments”. The Netherlands' Journal of Social Sciences, 41(1), 24-42 
GOLDBERG, L.R., SWEENEY,D., MERENDA, P.F., HUGHES, JR.J.E., (1998). “Demographic 
Variables and Personality:  The Effects of Gender, Age, Education, and Ethnic/Racial 
Status on Self-Descriptions of Personality Attributes” Pers. Individ. Dif. 24(3), 393–403. 
GROVES, R. M., FOWLER JR, F. J., COUPER, M. P., LEPKOWSKI, J. M., SINGER, E., & 
TOURANGEAU, R. (2009). Survey methodology 2nd edition. Wiley. 
HECKMAN, J.J., STIXRUD, J., URZUA, S. (2006) “The Effects of Cognitive and 
Noncognitive Abilities on Labor Market Outcomes and Social Behavior.” J. Labor Econ. 
24(3), 411–482. 
HEDENGREN AND STRATMANN (2012). “The Dog that Didn’t Bark: What Item 
Nonresponse Shows about Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Ability.” Taken from 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2194373 
HITT, C. (2015) “Just Filling in the Bubbles: Using Careless Answer Patterns on 
Surveys as a Proxy Measure of Noncognitive Skills.” EDRE Working Paper No. 2015-06, 
Department of Education Reform, University of Arkansas. 
HITT, C., TRIVITT, J. AND CHENG, A. (2016) “When You Say Nothing at All: The 
Predictive Power of Student Effort on Surveys” Economics of Education Review. In 
Press. 
JACOB, B. (2002). “Where the boys aren’t: Non-cognitive skills, returns to school and 
the gender gap in higher education.” Economics of Education Review 21, 589-598. 
LLERAS, C. (2008). “Do Skills and Behaviors in High School Matter? The Contribution 
of Noncognitive Factors in Explaining Differences in Educational Attainment and 
Earnings.” Soc. Sci. Res. 37(3), 888–902. 
LOUNSBURY, J.W., STEEL, R.P., LOVELAND, J.M., GIBSON, L.W. (2004) “An 
Investigation of Personality Traits in Relation  to Adolescent School Absenteeism.” J. 
Youth Adolesc. 33(5), 457–466. 
 
 84 
MISCHEL, W., SHODA, Y., RODRIGUEZ, M.L. (1989) “Delay of Gratification in Children.” 
Science 244 (4907), 933–938. 
PONITZ, C.C., MCCLELLAND, M.M., JEWKES, A.M., CONNOR, C.M., FARRIS, C.L., 
MORRISON, F.J. (2008). “Touch Your Toes! Developing a Direct Measure of Behavioral 
Regulation in Early Childhood.” EarlyChild. Res. Q.23(2), 141–158. 
POROPAT, A.E. (2009) “A Meta-Analysis of the Five-Factor Model of Personality and 
Academic Performance.” Psychol. Bull. 135(2), 322–338. 
SEGAL, CARMIT (2012) “Working When No One Is Watching: Motivation, Test Scores, 
and Economic Success.” Management Science 58 (8): 1438–57 
TORIJA, P. (2012). “Straightening PISA: When students do not want to answer 
standardized tests.” Unpublished manuscript. Taken from 
http://www.econ.jku.at/members/Department/files/ResearchSeminar/SS12/torija.pdf 
VALIENTE, C., LEMERY-CHALFANT, K., CASTRO, K.S. (2007) “Children’s Effortful 
Control and Academic Competence.” Merrill Palmer Q. 53(1), 1–25. 
VAN EIJCK, K., DE GRAAF, P.M., (2004). “The Big Five at School: The Impact of 
Personality on Educational Attainment.” Neth. J. Soc. Sci. 40(1), 24–40. 
WONG, M.M., CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, M. (1991). “Motivation and Academic Achievement: 







8. Figures and Tables 
Figure 9. Percentage of students skipping at least one question, by subject and grade 
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Figure 11. Skipping rates in Reading and difficulty of the question 
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Table 17. Skipping frequency: Number of exams where students skip 
N. Students who skip 
at least one question 
in: Freq.  Percent  
0 exams  328,847 84% 
1 exam  53,412 14% 
2 exams  8,393 2% 
3 exams  1349 0% 
4 exams  234 0% 
5 exams  40 0% 






Table 18. Characteristics of students who skip questions, by different skipping 
incidences 



















    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Number Students 384,729 323,165 39,791 11,898 9,664 
 
   Pct students 100% 84% 10% 3% 3% 
 
Number Schools (1) 952 952 947 916 920 
 
White 76.5% 78.8% 67.6% 64.6% 51.1% 
 
Black 16.0% 13.8% 24.2% 28.3% 42.1% 
 
Hispanic 4.1% 3.9% 5.2% 4.5% 4.6% 
 
Asian 2.3% 2.4% 1.9% 1.5% 1.3% 
 
Ever Free/Reduced Lunch Status 50.0% 47.7% 59.6% 62.7% 72.0% 
 
Limited English Proficiency 2.8% 2.6% 3.6% 3.3% 3.7% 
 
Special Education 10.8% 9.6% 15.5% 17.4% 22.5% 
 
Female 50.2% 50.9% 47.2% 46.7% 43.7% 
 
Age 13.30 13.29 13.32 13.33 13.37 
 
Middle School Std Test Scores 
     
  
Av Math MS (2) 0.02 0.10 -0.33 -0.43 -0.75 
  
Av Reading MS 0.02 0.10 -0.31 -0.45 -0.73 
  
Av 7th Grade (3) 0.02 0.10 -0.32 -0.44 -0.76 
  
Av 8th Grade 0.02 0.10 -0.32 -0.44 -0.74 




Table 18. Characteristics of students who skip questions, by different skipping 
incidences (cont) 
 


















    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 HS Std Test Scores (5) 
     
  
Math MME 0.01 0.08 -0.30 -0.37 -0.74 
  
Reading MME 0.01 0.07 -0.27 -0.30 -0.62 
  
Science MME 0.01 0.08 -0.30 -0.37 -0.70 
  
Composite ACT 0.01 0.08 -0.32 -0.36 -0.68 
  
Math ACT 0.01 0.08 -0.31 -0.36 -0.63 
  
Reading ACT 0.01 0.07 -0.27 -0.29 -0.56 
  
Science ACT 0.01 0.08 -0.30 -0.35 -0.66 
 
HS Grade Repeat 11.2% 9.8% 16.1% 19.5% 24.5% 
 
HS Graduation 
     
  
Graduated after 4yr (6) 86.0% 87.6% 79.9% 76.3% 69.1% 
  
Still enrolled after 4yr (7) 10.1% 9.0% 14.5% 16.7% 21.8% 
  
Graduated after 5yr (8) 88.2% 89.7% 83.1% 79.8% 73.1% 
  
Still enrolled after 5yr 6.5% 5.7% 9.5% 10.9% 15.2% 
 
College Enrollment (9) 
     
  
4yr College 38.3% 40.5% 29.0% 26.0% 19.1% 
  
2yr College 23.9% 23.7% 24.8% 24.9% 23.4% 
    Any College 62.2% 64.3% 53.8% 50.9% 42.5% 
Notes: The sample consists of all students who started the 7th grade for the first time between 2006 
and 2009. All test scores are standardized by grade and year. (1) Number of schools with at least one 
student in the corresponding subgroup. (2) Av. Math standardized test scores across Middle School 
(MS) grades (7-8). (3) Av. 7th grade standardized test scores across subjects (Math and Science). (4) 
Av. standardized test scores across MS grades and subjects. (5) The high school achievement test 
refers to the MME examination designed by the state of Michigan. The ACT test is embbeded 
within the MME (6) Defined as having graduated from high school (HS) 4 years after starting 9th 
grade for the 1st time. (7) Still enrolled in HS 4 years after starting 9th grade for the 1st time (8) 
Having graduated from HS 5 years after starting 9th grade. (9) Enrolled in a 4yr college 1 year after 




Table 19. Who skips? Predictors of skipping only one question in one single exam 
 




  (1) (2) 
Black 0.031*** 0.007*** 
 
(0.002) (0.001) 
Hispanic 0.018*** -0.002 
 
(0.003) (0.002) 
Asian 0.014*** 0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.002) 
Ever Free/Reduced Lunch 0.005*** 0.002*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Female -0.011*** -0.004*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Special Education 0.010*** 0.005*** 
 
(0.002) (0.001) 
Limited English Proficiency 0.001 -0.006*** 
 
(0.004) (0.002) 
Age 0.001 0.001* 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Av. Std. Middle Sch Test Scores -0.040*** -0.016*** 
 
(0.001) (0.000) 
   Observations 384,729 384,729 
R-squared 0.024 0.017 
 
Notes: The sample consists of all students who started the 7th grade for the 
first time between 2006 and 2009. Fixed effects at the 7th grade school level 
are included. All test scores are standardized by grade and year. Av. Std. 
Middle School Test Scores represents average test scores across middle 







Table 20. The relationship between skipping incidence and on-time high school 
graduation 
Dependent variable: On-time high 
school graduation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Skip Exactly 1 Question Ever 
  
-0.022*** -0.021*** -0.021*** 
   
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Skip Exactly 2+ Questions 
  
-0.052*** -0.052*** -0.049*** 
   
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Black -0.039*** 0.009** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.038*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Ever Free/Reduced Lunch Status -0.151*** -0.113*** -0.113*** -0.113*** -0.107*** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Female 0.047*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Av. Std Test Scores 
 
0.091*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.085*** 
  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
      Observations 384,729 384,729 384,729 384,729 384,729 
R-squared 0.090 0.126 0.127 0.128 0.147 
Cohort FE 
   
x x 
7th grade school FE 
    
x 
Notes: All specifications include indicators for limited english proficiency, special education, and a 







Table 21 Skipping and 4-Year High School Graduation Under Alternative Adjustments 













 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Skip Exactly 1 
Question Ever -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.025*** 
Skip Multiple 
Questions on Exactly 
1 Exam -0.046*** -0.052*** -0.058*** -0.070*** 
Skip at least 1 
question on Multiple 
Exams -0.058*** -0.065*** -0.070*** -0.083*** 

























Skip Exactly 1 
Question 
0.016*** -0.021*** 0.015*** -0.014*** -0.034*** 0.010** -0.036*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Skip 2+ Questions 
0.036*** -0.049*** 0.030*** -0.027*** -0.048*** 0.055*** -0.025*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
        Observations 384,729 384,729 384,729 384,729 357,965 359,379 358,660 
R-squared 0.137 0.147 0.102 0.207 0.548 0.578 0.555 
Sample mean 0.112 0.860 0.101 0.622 0.0135 0.0126 0.0131 
Notes:  Specifications match Model (5) in Table 20 above.  
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Chapter III.   
Childcare Programs and Their Spillover Effects on Older Siblings 
 
Abstract 
The study of childcare programs has focused on their effect on the wellbeing of 
young children and their mothers. However, less is known about how these 
programs affect other household members. This research paper investigates the 
effect of a public childcare program in Colombia on older sisters’ time use and 
educational attainment. Following Attanasio et al. (2006), who study the effect of 
this childcare program in young children, I use the time from the household to 
the closest childcare center as an instrument for program participation. The 
results reveal that having young siblings participating in the public childcare 
program is related to an increase in the time that older sisters spend on 
housework. A possible mechanism underlying this phenomenon is female labor 
supply. Specifically, childcare could incentivize mothers’ participation in the 
labor force, which prompts them to transfer their housework responsibilities to 
their older daughters. This change in girls’ time use, however, does not affect 
their educational attainment, since no significant effects are found on grade 
repetition, school attendance and drop-out rates. 
 96 
1. Introduction 
The last three decades have witnessed a significant increase in the share of families who 
leave their young children in the care of non-relatives, both in developed and developing 
countries. In the United States, for example, 56 percent of children under age 6 were 
being cared for by someone other than a parent in 2001, compared to 35 percent of 
children in 1985 (Baker, Gruber and Milligan, 2008). To support this trend, a large 
number of countries around the world have implemented policies to subsidize childcare 
programs. The impact of these policies has been the focus of considerable research 
seeking to identify the effects on children’s development and maternal labor supply. The 
studies reveal that the effect on children’s development strongly depends on childcare 
quality (see Blau and Currie (2006), Currie (2001) and Ruhm (2004) for a 
comprehensive review of the literature) and that the increased access to childcare has 
heterogeneous effects on maternal labor supply (Dhuey, Lamontagne and Tingting, 
2016).  
While the impact on child development and maternal labor supply is relatively 
established, less is known about how better access to childcare programs might affect 
other household members, in particular, other children in the family. To address this 
issue, this research paper investigates the effect of a Colombian public childcare 
program on older sisters’ time use and educational attainment, operating through a 
change in their housework responsibilities. Quantifying the spillover effects of childcare 
programs on older sisters allows a more nuanced measure of the welfare effects of early 
childhood programs, in the current era of increased investment in early childhood 
education. In addition, quantifying these effects can improve our understanding of the 
factors that boost or worsen girls’ education. 
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The direction of the effect of childcare access on older sisters’ education is unclear. On 
one hand, if older sisters were the main caregivers of their young siblings 1 , the 
availability of childcare could liberate their time, allowing them to spend more time in 
school related work, thus facilitating their educational attainment. On the other hand, if 
the availability of childcare programs incentivizes female labor supply, mothers could 
transfer housework responsibilities to older sisters, who now would have less time to 
devote to their studies. 
To answer the question of whether childcare access affects older sisters’ education 
outcomes, I study a public childcare program in Colombia, Hogares Comunitarios de 
Bienestar (HCB). HCB is a nationwide community early childhood program established 
by the Colombian government in 1986 to provide childcare and food to preschool 
children. The program has expanded rapidly since its introduction and is currently one 
of the largest welfare programs in Colombia: there are approximately 80,000 HCB 
centers across all municipalities in the country and these serve about one million 
children, from the poorest Colombian families. The cost of the program is significant, 
approximately $250 million, or almost 0.2% of Colombian GDP, compared to the Head 
Start program, which in 2004 cost $6.075 billion, or almost 0.05% of the US GDP.  
To identify the effect of this childcare program on older sisters’ time use and 
educational attainment, I implement an instrumental variables strategy, where the time 
needed to travel from the household to the closest HCB center is used as an instrument 
for participation in HCB. This strategy follows Attanasio, Di Maro and Vera-Hernández 
(2013) and Card (2005), who also use proxies for the availability and cost of programs 
as instruments for participation. The main threat to the validity of this empirical 
strategy is that households, as well as child care centers, tend to be located close to 
                                                
1 Studies of children’s time allocation have found that older children spend a significant amount of time in 
the care of younger siblings (Deutsch, 1998) and that the presence of older children in the household is 
negatively associated with the household choosing outside care (Deutsch, 1998; Fong and Lokshin, 1999).   
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other facilities like schools, health centers and the town hall. Therefore, the instrument 
could be capturing the effect of access to education and health facilities, as opposed to 
access to childcare services. I address this threat by controlling for the time from the 
household to schools and health centers. 
The results indicate that older sisters with young siblings who participate in HCB tend 
to spend more time doing housework tasks. These results would seem to support the 
hypothesis that better access to childcare programs lead mothers to enter the labor force 
and transfer their housework responsibilities to their older daughters. This would be 
consistent with Ilahi (2001) who finds that decreases in local female unemployment rates 
are related to increases in the time that boys and girls spend on housework in Peru. 
This change in older sisters’ time use, however, does not seem to affect their educational 
attainment, as no significant effects are found on grade repetition, school attendance or 
dropping-out rates. It is possible that the allocation of time to housework activities 
could affect girls’ academic achievement, as opposed to educational attainment. This 
remains an open question for future research.  
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. This is the first paper that 
assesses the spillover effects of childcare programs on other members of the family. The 
vast majority of the literature has focused on the effect of childcare programs on the 
development of participating children 2  or on maternal labor supply 3 , with scant 
attention to other members of the household, such as siblings. The only study on this 
topic is Currie, Garces and Thomas (2002), who provide suggestive evidence that 
                                                
2 Early Childhood programs such as Head Start, Perry Preschool and Abecedarian have been widely 
recognized for their positive effects on children development (Deming, 2009; Puma et al., 2012; 
Schweinhart et al. 2005; Heckman, et al. 2010; Campbell et al., 2001; Heckman et al., 2014). 
3 This literature has found heterogeneous effects of access to childcare on maternal labor supply. The 
effects depend on the marital status of the mother (Goux and Maurin, 2010; Cascio, 2009; Berlinski and 
Galiani, 2007), the baseline level of maternal employment (Nollenberger and Rodriguez-Planas, 2015; 
Calderon, 2014) and the labor market outcome studied - labor force participation or number of hours 
worked (Dhuey, Lamontagne and Tingting,  2016; Havnes and Mogstad, 2011; Fitzpatrick, 2012). 
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younger siblings of children who previously participated in Head Start were less likely to 
commit crimes.  
Second, this paper contributes to the literature on educational spillovers between 
siblings. Previous economics research concentrating on siblings has mainly focused on 
the intra-family allocation of resources (Becker, 1981), where parental investments on 
the human capital of children depend on parental preferences regarding inequality 
between children4, birth order and the number and gender composition of siblings.5 Only 
recently have researchers begun to look at the effect of interactions between siblings, 
focusing on how older siblings’ academic achievement or educational attainment affects 
the school outcomes of their younger siblings (see Oettinger 2000; Joensen and Nielsen 
2013; Adermon 2013; Nicoletti and Rabe, 2014; Qureshi 2015). This paper contributes to 
this growing literature, by providing evidence of spillovers in the opposite direction 
(from young siblings to older siblings) that so far have been unexplored. 
Finally, this paper provides causal evidence of the factors that determine the time that 
children spend on activities such us housework. Although the child labor literature has 
widely studied the determinants of children’s time allocation, the discussion has focused 
on the time that children spend in non-leisure activities such as market labor6 and 
schooling, with a limited focus on housework. This omission can understate the amount 
of time spent on work at home, especially for girls (Mason and Khandker, 1997; 
Grootaert and Patrinos, 1999; Ilahi 2001)7. The few existing studies have identified 
                                                
4  See Behrman et al. (1982), Ermisch and Francesconi (2000), Bernal (2008), and Rammohan and 
Robertson (2011) 
5 See e.g. Becker and Tomes (1976), Behrman and Taubman (1986), Butcher and Case (1994), Kessler 
(1991). 
6 Market labor includes working for wages or working in a production process in the household that 
results in marketable output. 
7 This is particularly important in low and middle-income countries where women invest more time on 
housework and childcare, compared to men (Kumar and Hotchkiss, 1988; Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 
1998; Burda, Hamermesh, and Weil, 2013). The literature on intra-household time allocation in 
developing countries has mainly investigated how adults allocate their time between income generating 
activities and housework, and whether this allocation is affected by changes in the wages of the spouse, 
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correlates of children spending time on housework, such as female unemployment, infant 
sickness and wealth, but causal evidence is surprisingly scarce (Pitt and Rosenzweig, 
1990; Ilahi, 2001; Skoufias, 1993; Galasso, 1999; Grootaert and Patrinos, 1999). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the HCB 
childcare program. It then moves to Section 3, which provides a conceptual framework 
for the spillover effects on older siblings. I then proceed to describe the data in Section 4 
and the empirical strategy in Section 5. The results are then presented in Section 6, 
finishing with the conclusions and discussion in Section 7. 
2. The Hogares Comunitarios de Bienestar (HCB) program8 
The HCB program started its operation in 1986 and is run by the Instituto Colombiano 
de Bienestar Familiar (ICBF). At the beginning, the ICBF regional office targeted poor 
neighborhoods and localities and encouraged eligible parents with children aged 0 to 6 
to form ‘parents associations’. After a few meetings with program officials, the parents 
associations were registered with the program and elected a madre comunitaria (or 
community mother). This mother should have primary education, a large enough and 
adequate house and would be certified by the regional office of the ICBF. The madre 
comunitaria (MC) would take care of up to 15 children aged 0 to 6 in her house. She 
would be also eligible for a subsidized loan to improve the infrastructure at her home to 
properly attend children, which means having at least one room, a kitchen and a 
bathroom, according to ICBF.  
The length of the care ranges from full-time (8 hours) to part-time (4 hours). However, 
the sample included in this paper is more likely to have access to part-time centers only. 
This is because the households in the sample are concentrated in rural areas and 40% of 
                                                                                                                                                       
access to basic services, agricultural modernization and idiosyncratic shocks; for a comprehensive review 
of this literature see Ilahi (2000).    
8 This section is a summary of the program description done by the Attanasio et al. (2013).  
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them live in the Atlantic region, which are geographical locations where part-time 
centers tend to be concentrated (Bernal and Fernandez, 2013).9 
Each family pays a small monthly fee, which is used to complement the MC’s wage (the 
rest of her wage comes from a fixed amount paid by the ICBF). The fee is negotiated 
between the parents’ association and the MC and is approved by the local office of the 
ICBF. The median monthly fee in poor rural areas is 3,800 pesos (approximately $1.5), 
which corresponds to 1% of the monthly minimum wage as of 200410.  The ICBF 
provides the funds to purchase the food. Children are given lunch, two daily snacks and 
a nutritional beverage called bienestarina. According to ICBF, the food and beverage 
provided constitutes 70% of the recommended daily amount of calories.  
Eligibility is means tested using a poverty index (SISBEN or Sistema de Beneficiarios 
potenciales para programas sociales), widely used in Colombia to target social policy. 
Each household is assigned a SISBEN category that ranges from 1 to 6 (1 being the 
poorest), on the basis of the value of the SISBEN score. This score is constructed using 
different indicators of economic well-being and is periodically updated by the local 
authorities. Children are eligible to participate in HCB if they belong to SISBEN 1 and 
2.  
After the start of the program and its rapid growth, the turnover among the MC was 
substantial. According to officials of the ICBF, between 10 and 15% of the existing 
HCBs are relocated in each year, in that a MC ceases to be such and a new one starts 
to operate it. Moreover, if a household moves to a certain neighborhood, it can normally 
register its children in an existing HCB, if there are available spaces. It seems that over 
time, the HCBs have evolved into relatively mobile and informal nurseries and have lost 
some of the tight connection with the original parents’ associations. Nowadays, one 
                                                
9  More details about the sample will be presented in section 4. 
10 Calculations based on the 2004 Familias en Accion survey. This survey is described with more detail 
later in section 5. 
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parent association is responsible for between 15 and 20 HCB childcare centers. However, 
MCs need to be certified by the ICBF, must maintain constant contact with it and 
provide the ICBF, at least in theory, with records of child development and growth. 
In rural and isolated areas, an apparently common problem is the difficulty to set up a 
new HCB because the ICBF does not start a new center unless there are a sufficient 
number of children who want to attend. On the other hand, in urban areas, the 
constraint is the number of places available: in many situations HCBs have waiting lists. 
3. A conceptual framework 
This section describes two simple intuitive models through which HCB might affect the 
time use and educational attainment of older siblings in the household.  
The first model follows the theoretical framework outlined in Qureshi (2015), in which 
the oldest sister affects the human capital acquisition of her younger brother. Starting 
with the standard model of human capital investment (Becker, 1964), parents allocate 
investments allocations among their children, by weighing the benefit of investment 
against its costs. Older siblings’ time can be invested in attaining more schooling or in 
taking care of their younger siblings. This creates a trade-off, because increasing 
educational attainment requires more time spent in school, doing homework and 
traveling to and from the education institute, and, therefore, less time spent with young 
siblings. As Qureshi (2015) mentions, this tradeoff is most acute when the young sibling 
is at pre-school age, since he is not yet enrolled in school and spends most of his time at 
home.  
The tradeoff increases the costs of older sisters’ education, as the forgone time giving 
childcare adds to the direct costs of schooling, such as tuition and fees, uniforms, books 
and supplies, and travel time from the school to home. The introduction of programs 
like HCB could ameliorate this tradeoff, since the time young siblings spend with their 
older sisters can be replaced by the time spent in public childcare. Indeed, time spent in 
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HCB can be an (imperfect) substitute for the time spent with older siblings, since the 
caregivers in HCB are community mothers, who are required to have at least basic 
education (equal to five years in Colombia).  
According to this model, a decrease in the cost of HCB (e.g. less travel time from the 
household to the HCB center) could facilitate the educational attainment of older 
siblings, by increasing the time that the young sibling spends in HCB and increasing the 
time that the older sibling invests in her own education.  
The second model highlights female labor supply as a mechanism through which HCB 
affects older siblings’ time use and education. The availability of childcare might 
incentivize mothers’ participation in the labor force, which can affect children’s 
education purely through and income effect. However, labor force participation of 
mothers, per se, could impact her children’s education through additional channels. 
First, as Afridi, Mukhopadhyay and Sahoo (2016) point out, mothers are likely to have 
more alternative uses of their time than fathers – market work, household chores and 
leisure. If children’s time in doing housework substitute for mother’s time, then an 
increase in labor force participation of mothers may lead to a decline in the educational 
attainment. Second, the higher female earned income may increase mother’s bargaining 
power and attach a greater weight to her preferences in household resource allocation. If 
mothers prefer to invest more in their children’s education, then we should see an 
improvement in children’s education (Blumber, 1988; Thomas, 1990; Hoddinott and 
Haddad, 1995; Quisumbing and Maluccion, 2003). 
4. Empirical Strategy 
The aim of this research paper is to estimate the impact of the availability of 
community childcare centers on the education of older siblings of eligible children who 
choose to attend them. It is challenging to identify a credible counterfactual that would 
allow measuring the average educational attainment of eligible children’s older siblings 
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in the absence of the program. HCB is widely available and many of the eligible children 
who do not attend do so by choice, which would likely introduce omitted variable bias 
problems. 
For instance, consider the OLS equation (1) where Yihm represents educational outcomes 
of children. The outcomes of interest consist of children’s school enrollment (current and 
previous year), grade repetition, dropping out of school and time use. The time use 
outcomes include the number of hours spent at school, doing homework, doing 
housework, working and resting. HCBh is the treatment variable of interest (younger 
sibling’s participation in the childcare center), measured as having at least one younger 
sibling in the household attending HCB or, alternatively, the percentage of younger 
siblings in the household enrolled in HCB. The equation also includes other covariates 
to control for child (Xihm), household (Xhm) and municipality (Xm) characteristics that 
might affect educational outcomes. Child characteristics include child’s age and gender, 
and an indicator for whether she attended HCB in the past11. Household characteristics 
include mother and head’s age and education, household wealth and composition of the 
household12. To control for the level of development of the municipality, the covariates 
also include the percentage of households with pipe water and sewage connection, and 
having a hospital in town.  
𝑌!!! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐻𝐶𝐵!! + 𝛽!𝑋!!! + 𝛽!𝑋!!+𝛽!𝑋! + 𝜀!!!  (1) 
Equation (1) suffers from omitted variable bias problems. On one hand, the poorest 
children attend HCB, possibly introducing a downward bias. This bias would not be 
avoided by controlling for per capita household income, because income is also affected 
                                                
11 This indicator is included because older siblings who were enrolled in HCB in the past might differ in 
unobserved ways than older siblings who were not enrolled. 
12 I include controls for the composition of the household (e.g. number of persons 0-5 years old, 6-10, …, 
40-59, 60 or more), since households with more young children are in higher need for childcare resources, 
and households with more elders or more non-working youth or adults might be in less need of them.  
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by childcare access13. Moreover, parents who are more aware of the importance of 
children’s nutrition or who are in need of caregivers are more likely to enroll their 
children in the program, possibly introducing an upward bias. Hence, the direction of 
the OLS bias is uncertain. 
To solve this bias problem, I use an instrumental variable strategy to identify how HCB 
affects older siblings’ education and time use. Specifically, instead of running (1), I 
estimate a two equation system of the form: 
𝐻𝐶𝐵!! = 𝛼! + 𝛼!𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒!! + 𝛼!𝑋!!! + 𝛼!𝑋!! + 𝛼!𝑋! + 𝑣!!  (2) 
            𝑌!!!  = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐻𝐶𝐵!! + 𝛽!𝑋!!! + 𝛽!𝑋!!+𝛽!𝑋! + 𝑢!!!  (3) 
by two-stage least squares and where I use time to HCB as an instrument for 
participation in HCB in equation (2) and, then, use the prediction 𝐻𝐶𝐵 to estimate the 
effect of HCB on children’s outcome in equation (3).  
The validity of the results depends critically on the identification assumptions. These 
assumptions are that: i) time to the center is a strong predictor of attendance to HCB 
(the relevance condition) and, ii) time to the center does not affect educational 
attainment or time use of older siblings, through a channel different than the 
participation of younger siblings in HCB. (the exogeneity condition) In the next section, 
I discuss the plausibility of these assumptions, possible threats to validity and how I 
overcome them.  
The validity of time to HCB as an instrument 
                                                
13 This is because childcare options influence female labor supply and, hence, could increase household 
income. The omitted variable bias problem is partially corrected when controlling for household wealth 
and parental education. However, this does not control for income volatility, which is a source of 
uncertainty and a possible driver of poverty. This omitted variable bias problem had already been 
identified by Attanasio et al. (2013) and Bernal and Fernandez (2013). 
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The instrumental variables literature has used measures of distance/time to a center as 
proxies for the cost of participation in a program. For example, Card (2005) uses 
distance to college as an instrument for college attendance to examine the returns to 
higher education. Another example is Attanasio et al. (2007, 2013), who uses time to 
HCB as an instrument for HCB participation, in order to measure the effect of HCB on 
female labor supply, children’s nutrition status and children’s medium term educational 
attainment.  
In the context of this paper, time from the household to the HCB is negatively 
correlated with the treatment, since children who take long to get to a HCB are less 
likely to attend the childcare centers. Time can be regarded as a strong instrument 
because it represents an important constraint for children’s attendance in rural areas, as 
indicated by ICBF officials (Attanasio et al. 2010). This affirmation is supported by the 
data. When parents of children 2-4 years old who do not attend HCB were asked about 
the reasons for not doing so, nearly 25% answered that it takes them long to get to the 
closest HCB or that there is no HCB facility nearby (Table 23).   
Regarding the exogeneity restriction, the main threat to validity is that wealthier 
households may choose to live close to schools, health centers and the town center. As 
HCB centers also tend to be located closer to these amenities, we would expect 
wealthier households to live closer to HCB childcare centers. Hence, any apparent 
positive effect of HCB on older siblings’ time use and education may instead be the 
result of families’ wealth or easier access to a school. I am able to assess this threat 
because the data used in this paper has information on the location of households. The 
data records whether the household lives in the center of the town, and the time to the 
town hall, health center and school (section 5 will describe the data with more detail). 
This allows me to control for the time to get to these amenities.  
Another threat to validity is that families who care about their young children’s 
nutrition or need support in giving care to them choose to live close to HCB centers or, 
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alternatively, advocate for opening new centers close to them. If this were true, any 
positive effect of HCB on the time use and education of older siblings would reflect 
parents’ behavior. Regarding endogenous mobility, Attanasio et al. (2013) provides 
evidence that households do not move with the main purpose of living closer to a HCB, 
probably due to the high turnover of these childcare centers. The households that 
changed location were asked the reason for moving. Although “moving to a closer HCB” 
was explicitly listed as an explanation, almost no households chose it.14  
In addition, the evolution of the HCB program makes it unlikely that nowadays parents 
would be able to put pressure on officials to open new centers. After the start of the 
program and its rapid growth, the turnover among the MCs was substantial and the 
link between the original parent association and the location of HCB centers was 
weakened. Hence, it would be difficult for parents to put pressure on the ICBF officials 
or to predict the location of new HCB centers. More likely, however, is that local 
governments advocate for having more HCB centers in town. In this case the 
instrument could also be endogenous, as any positive effect of HCB on children’s time 
use and educational attainment could reflect other policies that the department (state) 
governors are implementing, as they focus on children’s welfare policies (among them 
education). To assess this, I check the robustness of the results to the inclusion of fixed 
effects at the departmental level, and find no difference with the main results.  
Another possible threat is that the program targets poor towns. In this case, mostly 
poor regions would benefit, which would likely bias downward the results. I account for 
this by controlling for variables that proxy development at the municipality level, like 
the percentage of households with pipe water and a sewage connection and the existence 
of a hospital in town.   
                                                
14 These are households who moved between two consecutive waves of the survey used in this paper, but 
were found and interviewed after moving. Section 5 will describe the survey in more detail. 
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An additional possible source of bias is that the measure of time is self-reported and 
depends on the transport means of the household. Wealthier households who have a car 
would perceive themselves as living closer to the HCB, compared to households who live 
in the same are but have no car.  This could cause omitted variable bias, since having a 
car is a proxy for wealth and as such is negatively correlated with attendance to HCB 
(since poorer households participate) and positively correlated with educational 
attainment. I assess this threat by controlling for a household wealth index in the 
regressions. Although the wealth index does not include information on car ownership 
(because the survey does not ask about it), it does include information on ownership of 
other transport means such as a bike, motorcycles or boats, which are also proxies of 
wealth.  
A last threat is that parents’ preferences between siblings could also affect the time use 
and education of older siblings. The parents might have a preference for the younger 
child, which would make them invest more in her, compared to the older sibling. For 
instance, they could move closer to HCB so the young child can participate, without 
doing any comparable investment in the older. This would bias down the results, since 
the investment in the older sibling is low relative to the investments in the young one. 
However, as was mentioned before, households who moved between the first and second 
wave were identified, and when asked about the reasons for moving, they did not choose 
‘to be closer to a HCB center’ as an answer. 
Relation of the instrument with other covariates 
The estimates of the effects of HCB on older siblings would be inconsistent if the 
instruments would be correlated with unobserved determinants of children’s education 
and time use. While I cannot compute the correlation with unobserved variables, I can 
try to assess how realistic the assumption is by analyzing the relation between time to 
HCB and observed determinants of children’s education and time use. If I find that time 
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is correlated with many observed variables, it is highly unlikely that it would not be 
correlated with unobserved characteristics.  
Following Attanasio et al. (2013), I estimate regressions with the instrument at the left-
hand side and other socioeconomic characteristics at the right-hand side. This exercise 
measures the correlation of the instrument with observed determinants of children’s 
education and time use, conditional on other socioeconomic characteristics. The results 
are reported in Table 24. As column 1 reveals, wealthier households tend to live closer 
to HCB.  Specifically, families whose wealth index is one standard deviation above the 
sample average live 4 minutes closer to HCB and this relation is significant at the 1% 
level. This could bias upwards the results, because wealthier households could also 
choose to live closer to other amenities, which could improve older siblings’ education. 
With the purpose of correcting this bias, I include variables for the location of the 
household, such as time to the school, health center and town hall, and whether the 
household lives in the center of the town. As shown in Column 2, once these controls are 
added, the correlation between household wealth and time to HCB reduces to half its 
initial size. Conditional on time to other amenities, households whose wealth index is 
one standard deviation above average live only 2 minutes closer to HCB than 
households on the average, and this number is distinguishable from zero only at the 10% 
of significance. Other variables such as child gender and age, mother/head age and 
education and composition of the household are uncorrelated with the instrument, 
conditional on the wealth index. 
It is worth noting that some of the municipality variables are correlated with time to 
HCB. The percentage of households with pipe water service is positively correlated with 
time to HCB, while the percentage with a sewage connection is negatively correlated 
with it, even after controlling for the average time to amenities in the municipality 
(Column 2). The opposite correlations are contradictory, since both variables are 
indicators of the level of development of the municipality and, as such, would be 
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expected to have the same sign. This could be the result of the interaction of two 
different factors. First, the ICBF (the public institution in charge of HCB) has 
determined that childcare centers should have a minimum of sanitary and infrastructure 
conditions to serve as HCB, so the municipalities were the program operates should 
have a minimum level of development. On the other hand, the program targets poor 
households, and as such is likely to operate in less developed municipalities. Together, 
these two explanations could indicate that HCB operates in rural areas with a medium 
level of development. However, the sign of the bias that this causes is unclear.      
5. Data  
The data used comes from a survey originally collected to evaluate Familias en Accion 
(FeA), a Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) program.15 The households included in the 
survey had to satisfy the FeA eligibility criteria, which consist of living in relatively 
small towns with sufficient education and health infrastructure16, classifying in the 
lowest socio-economic category17 and having children between 0 and 17 years old. This 
implies that the FeA sample is representative of the poorest households in small towns.  
The FeA survey includes information on a variety of municipal and demographic 
variables, as well as current and past attendance of each child to HCB. In particular, it 
asks about the number of months the child participated in HCB for each year of her life, 
as well as the travel time to the closest HCB center.  
To avoid contamination with the FeA program, this paper uses the baseline survey 
(collected in summer 2002) and includes only towns where FeA had not yet been 
                                                
15 FeA consists of a cash transfer to families, conditional on school attendance by children ages 7-17. An 
additional basic nutrition subsidy is provided to families with children under 6 years, conditional on 
mothers taking their children to growth and development check-ups. 
16 The towns targeted by FeA had a population less than 100,000, were no department (state) capitals, 
and had sufficient education and health infrastructure, as a well as a bank. 
17 The socio-economic categories are constructed based on a welfare index (SISBEN), which is used by the 
Colombian government to target public social programs. The index is based on information systems that 
record assets, income and characteristics of the household.  
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implemented.18 The sample includes 65 municipalities, which includes 4,098 children 
between 0-6 years old and 9,178 children aged 7-17, of whom 4,452 have young siblings 
below age 6. However, the estimation sample only includes 2,612 of them due to missing 
variables.  
The main treatment variable is participation of young siblings in HCB. I consider two 
alternative definitions of participation in HCB: having at least one young sibling 
participating in HCB and the percentage of siblings below 6 years old participating.19  
The instrument for participation in HCB is the travel time from the household to the 
closest HCB center, which is a proxy for cost of participation.20 The question is framed 
in terms of time to travel (minutes), instead of distance to travel (km or miles). This is 
a feature typical of the Colombian household surveys, which takes into account that the 
extensive mountain system existent in Colombia greatly affects travel time. The large 
chain of mountains challenges the construction of transport infrastructure, which means 
that one mile of distance could represent a 20 minute-walk for a household that lives in 
a plain valley, compared to one hour-walk for a household that lives in the mountains.  
The regressions also include household socio-demographic characteristics that come from 
the survey. These consist of the child’s age and gender, the mother’s and the head of the 
household’s age and gender,21 and the composition of the household.22 A wealth index is 
                                                
18 Other waves were collected in July-November 2003, December 2005-March 2006 and December 2011-
January 2012. FeA was phased in and by 2006 all municipalities in the survey had received it. 
19  This measure of participation in HCB is contemporaneous, because it does not capture past 
participation of young siblings in HCB. Past participation could have affected past school enrollment of 
older siblings and, therefore, current school enrollment. I do not consider past participation as an 
alternative measure because there would be no instrument for it; the FeA survey does not ask about past 
travel time to the closest HCB. 
20 For households with participating children, this travel time variable records the time to the HCB center, 
while for those households with no participating children, it records the time to the closest HCB. 
21 I cannot identify who is the mother of every child in the household. However, I can identify the mother 
of every child below 0-6 years. I assume that the mother of every child younger than 6 is the same as the 
mother of every other child in the house. Whenever there are two mothers of children below 6 (63 
households), I choose the older of them as the mother. 
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also added, constructed based on the household’s assets and appliances information23. 
This index is standardized around the sample mean. 
Other variables include the travel time to the town hall and to the closest school and 
health center, as well as indicators for households living in the center of the town or in 
isolated rural areas. As explained in the previous section, these variables allow 
controlling for location factors that might influence older siblings’ education, through 
channels different than the access to HCB centers. 
The municipality level controls consist of variables that measure local economic 
development, such as having a hospital, and the percentage of households with pipe 
water and sewage connection.24 Other variables include the geographic region of the 
municipality, which account for the differences in economic development across the 
Colombian territory.25 
  
                                                                                                                                                       
22 It includes variables for the number of persons in the household in a specific age range: persons 0-5 
years old, 6-10, 11-15, 16-17, 18-39, 40-59, and 60 years old or more. 
23 Using principal components, I consolidate into a unique index information on ownership of a house, 
refrigerator, sewing machine, radio, bike, motorcycle, fan, blender, boat and animals. The index consists 
of the first principal component, which explains 21% of the total variance. 
24 These variables come from the 2005 census, except for the existence of a hospital, which is reported by 
the mayor and included in the household survey. 
25 The survey defines four geographical regions: Atlantic, Andean, Pacific and Coffee Zone. 
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Descriptive Statistics 
The main characteristics of the estimation sample are shown in Table 25. The sample 
consists of 2,612 children between 7-17 years old, who have at least one young sibling 
(below 6 years old) living in the household.  
Although the FeA survey is representative of rural areas in Colombia, 51% of the 
children in the sample live in the center of the town rather than dispersed in the 
countryside. Most mothers (67%) have not finished primary education, as well as most 
heads of the household (70%). The households in the sample are big, with 7.2 members 
on average. Of these, 4.5 are children below 15 years, who are almost evenly distributed 
in age range: 1.4 in the 0-5 years range, 1.7 in the 6-10 range and 1.3 who are 11-15. 
Only a few households have elders living with them (0.13 persons 60 or more years old), 
who could be potential caregivers of the young children.  
In terms of the degree of development of the municipalities included in the sample, 71% 
of them have access to a hospital, while only 66% (38%) of the households have access 
to pipe water (sewage connection). The municipalities in our sample are heavily located 
in the Atlantic region (44%), followed by the Andean and Coffee regions (22% each) and 
the Pacific region (13%).  
Half of the older siblings have attended HCB in the past, while one-third of them have 
at least one sibling currently attending (29%). On average, 24% of their young siblings 
are in HCB. The households live closer to schools (14 minutes) than to HCB (24 
minutes), but farther away from health centers (44 minutes) and town halls (56 
minutes). 
Education in Colombia is mandatory until the 9th grade (roughly 15 years old). Since 
the sample includes children until 17, we do not observe full enrollment. School 
enrollment rates of children 17 and younger during the current and last year are 80% 
and 83%, respectively. Of the 80% enrolled the year before, about a sixth failed and few 
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dropped out. Prolonged self-reported absences are not common, with only 3% of the 
parents reporting their children being absent last year during more than 20 days.26 
Children spend almost 1 hour doing housework (which can include caregiving), which is 
non- negligible if it’s compared with the amount of time spent doing homework (1.5 
hours).  
Thirty seven percent of the children’s mothers are currently working in the market (757 
mothers).27 Working mothers labor for 37 hours per week and worked on average 3.6 
months during the last 12 months. 
 
Figure 14 presents the distribution of age in the sample. Children’s age mostly falls in 
the 7-10 years old range (1534 observations) and, to a lesser extent, in the 11-14 years 
range (853). There are significantly fewer children in the 15-17 years range (234), as 
youth in low income families leave their households early. 
Figure 15 presents participation of younger siblings in HCB, differentiating by age range 
and gender of the older sibling. Overall, girls and boys do not have younger siblings 
participating in the program at a different rate.28 Accordingly, girls do not report to live 
closer to HCB than boys (Figure 16). 
Although the HCB program is targeted to the poorest families in Colombia, it is not the 
poorest of the poor who participate. Figure 17 shows the participation in HCB by 
income quintile within the sample, as defined by the income per capita in the 
                                                
26 This number might be underestimated, because parents have the incentive to underreport absences, to 
get the FeA cash transfer.  
27 A mother is considered currently working in the market if she reported spending most of her time 
working during the previous week.  
28 The exception is girls in the 15-17 years old range, who seem to have more young siblings attending 
HCB (30%), compared to boys (21%). However, this difference is not statistically different from zero, 
probably because the number of observations in this age range is very small. 
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household.29  A big portion of the participation comes from households in the 2nd and 3rd 
quintiles, as compared to the 1st quintile. One possible reason for this is that very poor 
households might not be able to pay for the fee and are more likely to have multiple 
generations living together as well, which increases the number of possible caregivers at 
home. On the other hand, children in households in the 4th and 5th quintiles attend at 
lower rates, perhaps because they are able to pay for other private childcare options30. 
Program uptake also seems to be higher in poorer municipalities, which was expected 
given that HCB targets poor families. As Figure 18 reveals, the percentage of children 
with younger siblings in HCB is positively correlated with the percentage of poor 
households in the municipality.  
Participation in the program is strongly correlated with the time to HCB. As Table 26 
shows, children with younger siblings attending HCB live on average 18 min closer than 
children with no young siblings attending. This relation also holds for other points in 
the time distribution, as shown in the Table. 
6. Results 
First Stage Estimations 
The first stage equation (2) predicts participation of younger siblings in the program as 
a function of time to HCB. The unit of observation is older siblings, e.g., children 7-17 
years old who have siblings 0-6 years old living at home. As mentioned before, 
participation in HCB is measured as i) having at least one younger sibling in HCB and 
ii) percentage of younger siblings in HCB. The instrumental variable time to HCB is 
included as a linear term, together with other covariates (mentioned in section 4). The 
                                                
29 The quintiles are ascending in income. 
30 I do not have information about the private childcare options for low-income families. However, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that working mothers who have no other caregivers at home pay other non-
working mothers in the neighborhood to take care of their children. 
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first stage is estimated first using the entire sample, and then on females separate from 
males, since I am interested in heterogeneous effects of HCB by gender.  
According to Table 27, time to HCB is a strong predictor of participation in the 
program. Columns 1 and 2 reveal that living 100 minutes closer to HCB increases 
participation in the program approximately by 16 percentage points, for both measures 
of participation considered. The F-statistics that result from performing a test of the 
significance of the instrument are 10.9 if participation is measured as having at least one 
young sibling in HCB and 12.6 if it is measured as the percentage of young siblings in 
HCB. These two statistics are above the 10-threshold recommended by Stock and Yogo 
(2005). The strength of time as an instrument in the full sample seems to be completely 
driven by girls. As columns 3 and 4 reveal, the F-statistics for the female sample are 
much higher (35 and 30, respectively), as opposed to the male sample with F-statistics 
4.8 and 6.4, which is a sign of a weak instrument problem for older brothers. 
Hence, time to HCB is a strong instrument for older sisters, but not for older brothers, 
which could be interpreted in two ways. The first is that families of females are 
intrinsically different than families of males. Table 25, which presents summary 
statistics by gender, reveals that this is unlikely to be the case. Observed characteristics 
of girls’ families are not very different than boys’ families. More plausible is that gender 
roles in Colombia are important when considering time to HCB as a constraint. For 
instance, older sisters could be considered as an option for taking care of young siblings, 
while older brothers are not. Hence, when facing the decision to enroll a young child in 
HCB, girls’ mothers weight the cost of enrolling the child (e.g., traveling a long time) vs. 
leaving him to the care of the oldest sister. Boy’s mothers might not face this dilemma 
since older brothers would not be considered possible caregivers.  





Table 28 presents the OLS and IV estimates using the entire sample (both females and 
males). The dependent variables measure educational attainment (Panel A) and 
children’s time use (Panel B). As mentioned in section 4, I include a large set of 
covariates at the individual, household and municipality level, which include time from 
the household to the closest school, health center and town hall. The regressions also 
include region dummies, and all standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.  
Panel A reveals that the OLS coefficients in the education equation have no consistent 
direction (positive or negative). For instance, children with young siblings attending 
HCB are 3% more likely to have been enrolled in school the year before, but are as well 
1.6% and 2.4% more likely to have dropped out or to have been absent 20-40 days, 
respectively. These contradictory results could be the result of the multiple directions 
the OLS bias could take (see section 4 for a detailed discussion of possible biases). 
The IV estimates of the educational attainment regressions are not conclusive either. 
The signs of some coefficients reveal that children with young siblings attending HCB 
tend to have worse educational outcomes than children who do not, while other 
coefficients point to the opposite direction. For example, those with younger siblings in 
HCB are 3% less likely to be currently enrolled, 16% less likely to have been enrolled 
last year, 9% less likely to have successfully completed the last grade and 3% likely to 
have dropped out. These coefficients are not statistically different from zero and conflict 
with other results, like being less likely to fail (12%) or less likely to be absent 20-40 
days (8%).  
Similarly, Panel B shows that the effect of HCB on children’s time use is imprecisely 
estimated. The IV coefficients on time spent working, doing homework or housework are 
different depending on the period recalled (the day before the interview or during extra 
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school hours in general) and they are not statistically different than zero. It is worth 
noting that OLS reveals that children with younger siblings attending HCB tend to do 
more housework than children who do not. This difference is statistically different from 
zero at the 90% confidence level, for both periods considered (day before or extra school 
hours) and for both measures of participation (having any young sibling in HCB or the 
percentage of young siblings in HCB).  
Effect of HCB on older sisters vs. older brothers 
Table 29 presents the IV estimates for older sisters and reveals that the results on the 
education equations are inconclusive, following the pattern with the full sample. For 
instance, older sisters with younger siblings in HCB were more likely to be enrolled the 
current year and less likely to have failed or dropped out, but, they were also less likely 
to be enrolled the year before and more likely to be absent more than 20 days. 
Furthermore, none of these coefficients are statistically different from zero. 
However, Table 7 does show a salient feature of older sisters’ time use. The OLS 
equation shows that girls with young siblings in HCB do 0.2 more hours (12 minutes) of 
housework than sisters who do not. When I include time to HCB as an instrument, this 
coefficient significantly increases to 1.1 more hours for both measures of participation 
considered (having any young sibling in HCB or the percentage of siblings in HCB). 
This is a large effect, considering that the sample average number of hours that older 
sisters spend doing housework is 1.5 hours (Table 3). Hence, the evidence suggests that 
participation of young siblings in HCB causes older sisters to spend more time doing 
housework.  
Table 30 presents the IV estimates for older brothers for completeness purposes. These 
results should not be given much consideration, since time to HCB is a weak instrument 
for the male sample and no inference should be made if the instrument does not induce 
participation in the program for this subsample.      
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Why does HCB induce girls to spend more time doing housework?  
One possible explanation for the results is the effect of HCB on female labor supply. 
Mothers who were previously taking care of the young children (full-time or part-time) 
would be able to work or to increase their hours of work when the program becomes 
more accessible to them. They could then transfer to their older daughters some of their 
housework duties. 
Table 31 presents the effect of HCB on female labor supply, using also time to HCB as 
an instrument and including the same set of covariates as the education and time use 
equations. The unit of observation is still children 7-17 with siblings aged 0-6, but it 
includes only children for whom the mother’s labor information is available, which 
decreases the sample size to roughly 2000 observations. Since the unit of observation is 
the child and not the mother, these regressions implicitly weight each mother by the 
number of children between 7 and 17 years in the household. 
Unfortunately, the first stage is sensitive to the number of observations. The F-statistics 
were above the 10-threshold when all children 7-17 were incorporated, but when only 
children with information on maternal labor supply are included, the numbers decrease 
to 6.3, making time to HCB a weak instrument for this subsample. Thus, the second 
stage results should be interpreted with caution, since a weak instrument biases the IV 
estimates in the direction of the OLS estimates. As mentioned in section 4, there are 
two possible directions for the OLS bias: downwards, since mostly poor households 
enroll children in HCB, and also upwards, since those parents more aware of the 
importance of children’s nutrition are the ones who enroll them in the program. 
Having noted the weakness of time as an instrument for this subsample, I proceed to 
describe and interpret the results. The evidence indicates that mothers who have any 
young child in HCB are 85 percentage points more likely to be working, compared to 
mothers with no child in HCB. On average, they work 41 more hours per week and 9 
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more months per year. These coefficients are too large to be plausible. The results are 
similar when I only use the sample of working mothers, which estimates the parameter 
in the extensive margin (and avoids imputing zero hours and months of work to non-
working mothers). Although this change in the sample decreases the size of the 
coefficients, their magnitudes are still large and implausible. When HCB becomes 
available, working mothers increase their time working to 30 more hours per week and 
2.4 more months per year. However, only the first of these numbers is significant at the 
10% level, probably because the sample size reduces abruptly to 734 observations. 
7. Conclusions and Discussion 
This paper uses one of the largest welfare programs in Colombia, Hogares Comunitarios 
de Bienestar (HCB), to measure the spillover effects of childcare programs on older 
siblings in the family. I attempt to identify the effect of having a younger sibling in 
HCB on older siblings’ educational attainment. The mechanism proposed is time use, 
since older children might be the caregivers of younger ones, preventing them from 
spending more time on school-related duties. This effect is expected to be stronger for 
older sisters than for older brothers, given the gender roles characteristic of Colombia 
and other Latin American countries.  
Since the OLS estimates are likely to suffer from omitted variable bias, I use time to 
HCB as an instrument for participation in the program. Time is a proxy for the 
availability and cost of the program, so it should induce the participation of a portion of 
the population. The main threat to the validity of the instrument is that wealthier 
households tend to locate close to other amenities like schools, health centers and the 
town center. Since HCB centers also locate close to these facilities, this would induce a 
correlation between the instrument and the outcomes, violating the exclusion restriction. 
However, the time from households to schools, health centers and town hall are 
observed and are included in the regressions, controlling for this endogenous relation. 
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The results reveal that females with young siblings attending HCB spend more time 
doing housework than females with no siblings in HCB. However, this deviation of older 
sisters’ time towards housework does not seem to affect their educational attainment, as 
the results of the effects on school attendance, drop-out and grade repetition are not 
conclusive. Although it would be desirable to compare these results to those of older 
brothers, it is not possible to do so with this sample, because time to HCB is a weak 
instrument for attendance to HCB in the sample of boys with young siblings ages 0-6. 
The effect of HCB on older sisters’ time allocation could be explained by the effect of 
the program on female labor supply. The availability of the program could facilitate the 
participation of mothers on the labor force, who in turn would need additional support 
from their older daughters to perform housework. Indeed, the literature on the effects of 
HCB on household well-being points in this direction. Attanasio and Vera (2007) find 
that when HCB is available, mothers likelihood to be employed increases by 37 
percentage points and their number of hours worked goes up by 75 per month. Given 
these effects on female labor supply. However, it is not possible to replicate these results 
with my estimation sample. When restricting the sample to households with a record of 
maternal labor supply, and that have children in both the 0-6 and 7-17 age range, the 
sample size reduces drastically. This reduction makes time to HCB a weak instrument 
for participation, limiting the conclusions that can be drawn from the second stage 
estimations. Therefore, further research is needed to identify the interaction between 
participation of a younger sibling in HCB and the female labor supply, and the effect of 
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9. Figures and Tables 
Table 23 Reasons for not attending HCB 
  Age 0-1 Age 2-4 Age 5-6 
No HC facility 9.6% 12.9% 7.6% 
Too far 7.8% 10.4% 5.6% 
Cannot afford fee 6.3% 9.9% 3.5% 
Available caregiver at 
home 68.5% 34.8% 18.0% 
The child is studying 0.1% 24.0% 68.2% 
Age 8.1% 3.7% 2.6% 
Other 5.1% 14.7% 26.9% 
Number of observations: 3,954 eligible children not attending. Data 












Female -0.0151 -0.00519 
 
(0.0185) (0.0171) 
Child age -0.0223 0.00766 
 
(0.0284) (0.0261) 
Child age squared 0.00124 -4.67e-05 
 
(0.00131) (0.00113) 
ln(head age) -0.0112 -0.0417 
 
(0.0819) (0.0729) 
ln(mother age) -0.108 -0.0913 
 
(0.254) (0.240) 
Mother no primary 0.0543 -0.0118 
 
(0.0356) (0.0304) 
Mother primary 0.0190 0.00441 
 
(0.0379) (0.0356) 
Head no primary 0.0401 -0.0291 
 
(0.0419) (0.0412) 
Head primary 0.0645 0.0159 
 
(0.0534) (0.0470) 
Wealth index (standardized) -0.0448*** -0.0225* 
 
(0.0160) (0.0114) 
Nchildren 0-5 0.0174 0.00642 
 
(0.0197) (0.0194) 
Npersons 6-10 0.0253 0.0166 
 
(0.0236) (0.0200) 
Nchildren 11-15 0.0100 0.00894 
 
(0.0212) (0.0206) 
Nchildren 16-17 -0.0368 -0.0151 
 
(0.0389) (0.0370) 
Npersons 18-39 -0.00680 -0.000343 
 
(0.00825) (0.00865) 
Npersons 40-59 0.0323 0.0249 
 
(0.0286) (0.0309) 
Npersons 60 or more 0.0140 0.0143 
 
(0.0302) (0.0300) 
Hospital in town 0.0531 0.0321 
 
(0.0660) (0.0448) 
% households pipe water 0.187 0.209** 
 
(0.142) (0.104) 
% households sewage connection -0.380*** -0.207*** 
 
(0.115) (0.0754) 







Table 24 Relation of time to HCB with covariates (cont) 
 






























Atlantic region -0.399*** -0.270*** 
 
(0.0993) (0.0690) 
Andean region 0 0 
 
(0) (0) 
Coffee region -0.0794 -0.0702 
 
(0.118) (0.0743) 
Pacific region -0.366*** -0.296*** 
 
(0.125) (0.0845) 
Constant 0.281 -0.0593 
 
(0.279) (0.213) 
   
Nobservations 2,621 2,621 





Table 25 Summary statistics 
Panel A. Sociodemographic characteristics 
          
 

















   
Female 0.46 0.50 2621 1.00 0.00 1211 0.00 0.00 1410 
Child age 10.27 2.66 2621 10.20 2.59 1211 10.34 2.72 1410 
Order 2.41 1.47 2578 2.39 1.43 1187 2.44 1.51 1391 
At least one young sibling in HCB 0.29 0.45 2621 0.27 0.44 1211 0.31 0.46 1410 
% young siblings in HCB 0.24 0.39 2621 0.23 0.39 1211 0.25 0.40 1410 
Attended HCB past 0.50 0.50 2621 0.50 0.50 1211 0.50 0.50 1410 
Household characteristics 




   
Head age 0.40 0.09 2621 0.40 0.09 1211 0.40 0.09 1410 
Mother age 0.35 0.07 2621 0.34 0.07 1211 0.35 0.07 1410 
Mother no primary 0.67 0.47 2621 0.66 0.47 1211 0.69 0.46 1410 
Mother primary 0.29 0.45 2621 0.30 0.46 1211 0.28 0.45 1410 
Mother secondary 0.04 0.20 2621 0.04 0.20 1211 0.04 0.19 1410 
Head no primary 0.70 0.46 2621 0.67 0.47 1211 0.72 0.45 1410 
Head primary 0.25 0.43 2621 0.27 0.45 1211 0.23 0.42 1410 
Head secondary 0.05 0.21 2621 0.05 0.22 1211 0.04 0.21 1410 
Wealth index (standardized) -0.06 0.93 2621 -0.06 0.93 1211 -0.07 0.92 1410 
Household size 7.29 2.34 2621 7.18 2.32 1211 7.39 2.35 1410 
Nchildren 0-5 1.47 0.93 2621 1.43 0.93 1211 1.50 0.94 1410 
Npersons 6-10 1.75 0.95 2621 1.73 0.95 1211 1.76 0.95 1410 
Nchildren 11-15 1.33 1.04 2621 1.28 1.03 1211 1.36 1.04 1410 
Nchildren 16-17 0.27 0.51 2621 0.26 0.50 1211 0.28 0.51 1410 
Npersons 18-39 1.69 0.96 2621 1.70 0.95 1211 1.69 0.96 1410 
Npersons 40-59 0.66 0.77 2621 0.64 0.75 1211 0.67 0.78 1410 
Npersons 60 or more 0.13 0.39 2621 0.13 0.39 1211 0.13 0.39 1410 
Municipality characteristics 




   Hospital in town 0.71 0.46 2621 0.70 0.46 1211 0.71 0.45 1410 
% households pipe water 0.66 0.23 2621 0.67 0.23 1211 0.66 0.23 1410 
% households sewage connection 0.38 0.25 2621 0.38 0.26 1211 0.38 0.25 1410 
Atlantic region 0.42 0.49 2621 0.41 0.49 1211 0.44 0.50 1410 
Andean region 0.22 0.42 2621 0.24 0.43 1211 0.21 0.41 1410 
Coffee region 0.22 0.41 2621 0.21 0.40 1211 0.23 0.42 1410 




Table 25 Summary Statistics(cont) 
Panel B. Time variables 
          
 












Time to HCB (minutes divided by 
100) 
0.24 0.40 2621 0.24 0.38 1211 0.25 0.41 1410 
Time to health center (minutes 
divided by 100) 
0.44 0.63 2621 0.41 0.53 1211 0.47 0.70 1410 
Time to school (minutes divided by 
100) 
0.14 0.15 2621 0.14 0.15 1211 0.14 0.15 1410 
Time to town hall (minutes divided 
by 100) 
0.56 0.81 2621 0.53 0.76 1211 0.59 0.85 1410 
Lives center of the town 0.51 0.50 2621 0.52 0.50 1211 0.51 0.50 1410 
Av. Time health center 0.45 0.33 2621 0.44 0.32 1211 0.46 0.33 1410 
Av. Time to school 0.14 0.06 2621 0.14 0.06 1211 0.14 0.06 1410 
Av. Time town hall 0.58 0.44 2621 0.56 0.43 1211 0.59 0.44 1410 
 
         
Panel C. Outcomes 
          
 

















   
Currently enrolled 0.83 0.38 2621 0.86 0.34 1211 0.80 0.40 1410 
Enrolled 0.80 0.40 2621 0.83 0.38 1211 0.78 0.42 1410 
Passed 0.64 0.48 2621 0.69 0.46 1211 0.60 0.49 1410 
Failed 0.13 0.34 2621 0.11 0.32 1211 0.15 0.35 1410 
Dropped out 0.02 0.15 2621 0.02 0.13 1211 0.03 0.16 1410 
Absent more 20 days 0.03 0.18 2621 0.02 0.15 1211 0.04 0.20 1410 
Absent 40+ days 0.01 0.12 2621 0.01 0.09 1211 0.02 0.14 1410 
Child time use 




   
N. hours work day before 0.51 1.85 2621 0.23 1.17 1211 0.76 2.25 1410 
N. hours at school day before 1.54 2.50 2621 1.60 2.52 1211 1.49 2.47 1410 
N. hours homework day before 0.35 0.83 2621 0.38 0.84 1211 0.33 0.81 1410 
N. hours housework day before 0.55 1.27 2621 0.76 1.54 1211 0.36 0.94 1410 
N. hours housework extra school  0.11 0.64 2171 0.06 0.48 1044 0.16 0.75 1127 
N. hours housework extra school  0.97 0.98 2172 1.11 1.00 1045 0.85 0.93 1127 
N. hours homework extra school  1.45 0.73 2172 1.49 0.71 1045 1.41 0.74 1127 
N. hours housework extra school  2.86 1.44 2172 2.70 1.41 1045 3.01 1.46 1127 
Female labor 




   
Mother working 0.37 0.48 2054 0.39 0.49 948 0.35 0.48 1106 
N. hours work/week (conditional) 36.95 19.41 737 37.12 18.82 354 36.80 19.96 383 
N. hours work/week (unconditional) 13.32 21.19 2034 14.00 21.38 935 12.75 21.02 1099 
Nmonths work (conditional) 9.88 3.64 751 9.90 3.51 364 9.85 3.77 387 
Nmonths work (unconditional) 3.62 5.25 2050 3.81 5.29 946 3.45 5.20 1104 
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Table 26 Distribution of time to HCB 
 
Time to HCB (mins) 
  All children 
Children with at least one 
young sibling HCB 
25th percentile 3 3 
Median 7 5 
Mean 26 8 
75th percentile 30 10 
 
Table 27 First stage regressions 
 























  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       Time to HCB -0.167*** -0.151*** -0.190*** -0.172*** -0.154** -0.139** 
 
(0.0504) (0.0424) (0.0322) (0.0315) (0.0698) (0.0551) 
       Observations 2,612 2,612 1,207 1,207 1,405 1,405 
R-squared 0.252 0.223 0.278 0.244 0.249 0.225 
       F-statistic 10.9 12.6 34.9 29.7 4.8 6.4 
       Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. The units for time to HCB 
are minutes divided by 100. The regressions include child and household characteristics such as child’s age 
and gender, the mother’s and the head of the household’s age and gender, and indicators for the 
composition of the household (number of persons 0-5 years old, 6-10,11-15, 16-17, 18-39, 40-59 and 60 
years old or more). A household wealth index is also included, constructed based on the household’s assets 
and appliances information. Municipality characteristics include having a hospital in town, percentage of 
households with pipe water and percentage with sewage connection. I also control for household location 
variables, such as living in the center of the town and time to the health center, the school and the town 
hall. Other variables include department (state) fixed effects and indicators for the geographic region in 






Table 28 Effect of HCB on older siblings’ education and time use 
 
Panel A. Effect on education outcomes 
  
Enrolled             
(this year) 
Enrolled             
(last year) 
Passed             
(last year) 
Failed             
(last year) 






days (last year) 
 
OLS 
Any young sibling in 
HCB 
0.0161 0.0330 0.0172 0.00264 0.0160 0.0243* 0.0131 
(0.0204) (0.0256) (0.0467) (0.0329) (0.0103) (0.0144) (0.00831) 
Pct young siblings 
HCB 
0.000753 0.0211 0.0183 -0.0154 0.0217* 0.0270 0.0169 
(0.0244) (0.0335) (0.0543) (0.0380) (0.0129) (0.0167) (0.0107) 
 
IV 
Any young sibling in 
HCB 
-0.0326 -0.169 -0.0979 -0.126 0.0290 -0.0869 0.00298 
(0.186) (0.211) (0.192) (0.198) (0.0736) (0.137) (0.0664) 
Pct young siblings 
HCB 
-0.0361 -0.187 -0.108 -0.139 0.0321 -0.0961 0.00329 
(0.206) (0.237) (0.212) (0.224) (0.0826) (0.150) (0.0736) 
        Nobs 2,612 2,612 2,612 2,612 2,612 2,612 2,612 






















Table 28 Effect of HCB on older siblings’ education and time use (cont) 
 
Panel B. Effect on Time Use 
 





















Any young sibling in 
HCB 
0.0924 -0.0192 0.000126 0.114* 0.0330 0.128* -0.0423 0.0105 
(0.150) (0.112) (0.0374) (0.0681) (0.0536) (0.0717) (0.0514) (0.114) 
Pct young siblings in 
HCB 
0.0936 -0.0827 -0.00440 0.162* 0.0197 0.143** -0.0506 0.0106 
(0.180) (0.137) (0.0418) (0.0873) (0.0649) (0.0623) (0.0600) (0.132) 
 
IV IV 
Any young sibling in 
HCB 
0.0470 1.356 0.481 -0.550 -0.149 0.00116 -0.293 0.344 
(1.036) (1.667) (0.355) (0.472) (0.333) (0.422) (0.298) (0.953) 
Pct young siblings in 
HCB 
0.0519 1.499 0.532 -0.608 -0.173 0.00135 -0.340 0.400 
(1.147) (1.864) (0.390) (0.521) (0.387) (0.490) (0.354) (1.119) 
    
  
    Nobs 2,612 2,612 2,612 2,612 2,163 2,164 2,164 2,164 
         Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. The units for time to HCB are minutes divided by 100. The regressions 
include child and household characteristics such as child’s age and gender, the mother’s and the head of the household’s age and gender, and 
indicators for the composition of the household (number of persons 0-5 years old, 6-10,11-15, 16-17, 18-39, 40-59 and 60 years old or more). A 
household wealth index is also included, constructed based on the household’s assets and appliances information. Municipality characteristics include 
having a hospital in town, percentage of households with pipe water and percentage with sewage connection. I also control for household location 
variables, such as living in the center of the town and time to the health center, the school and the town hall. Other variables include department 




Table 29 Effect of HCB on older sisters’ education and time use 
 
Panel A. Effect on education outcomes 
 
  
Enrolled             
(this year) 
Enrolled             
(last year) 
Passed             
(last year) 
Failed             
(last year) 











 Any young 
sibling in HCB 
0.0123 0.0613** -0.00979 0.0628 0.0148 0.0225 0.0127 
 (0.0272) (0.0292) (0.0671) (0.0433) (0.0149) (0.0186) (0.0142) 
 Pct young 
siblings in HCB 
0.00384 0.0516 -0.000523 0.0392 0.0194 0.0287 0.0177 




 Any young 
sibling in HCB 
0.106 -0.0540 0.00661 -0.0126 -0.0329 0.0538 0.0192 
 (0.205) (0.263) (0.216) (0.141) (0.0615) (0.0598) (0.0290) 
 Pct young 
siblings in HCB 
0.117 -0.0599 0.00733 -0.0139 -0.0364 0.0596 0.0213 
 (0.229) (0.290) (0.239) (0.156) (0.0673) (0.0671) (0.0324) 
 
         Nobs 1,207 1,207 1,207 1,207 1,207 1,207 1,207 
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Table 29 Effect of HCB on older sisters’ education and time use 
 
 
Panel B. Effect on Time Use 
 





















sibling in HCB 
-0.0106 -0.0345 -0.00588 0.197* 0.0508 0.222** -0.126* 0.185 
(0.0907) (0.213) (0.0709) (0.102) (0.0615) (0.111) (0.0727) (0.162) 
Pct young 
siblings in HCB 
-0.0141 -0.0653 -0.00873 0.249* 0.0496 0.243** -0.151* 0.173 




sibling in HCB 
-0.307 2.566 0.543 -1.195 -0.0238 1.075*** -0.137 0.562 
(0.781) (1.788) (0.357) (1.279) (0.421) (0.384) (0.525) (0.926) 
Pct young 
siblings in HCB 
-0.340 2.842 0.601 -1.323 -0.0277 1.252*** -0.160 0.655 
(0.870) (2.033) (0.391) (1.445) (0.490) (0.464) (0.610) (1.077) 
    
  
    Nobs 1,207 1,207 1,207 1,207 1,040 1,041 1,041 1,041 
         Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. The units for time to HCB are minutes divided by 100. The 
regressions include child and household characteristics such as child’s age and gender, the mother’s and the head of the household’s age and 
gender, and indicators for the composition of the household (number of persons 0-5 years old, 6-10,11-15, 16-17, 18-39, 40-59 and 60 years old or 
more). A household wealth index is also included, constructed based on the household’s assets and appliances information. Municipality 
characteristics include having a hospital in town, percentage of households with pipe water and percentage with sewage connection. I also control 
for household location variables, such as living in the center of the town and time to the health center, the school and the town hall. Other 







Table 30 Effect of HCB on older brothers’ education and time use 
 
Panel A. Effect on education outcomes 
 
  
Enrolled             
(this year) 
Enrolled             
(last year) 
Passed             
(last year) 
Failed             
(last year) 











 Any young 
sibling in HCB 
0.0182 0.0122 0.0392 -0.0459 0.0190 0.0272 0.0143 
 (0.0237) (0.0475) (0.0426) (0.0329) (0.0138) (0.0203) (0.00959) 
 Pct young 
siblings in HCB 
0.00518 0.00591 0.0380 -0.0568 0.0251 0.0282 0.0183 




 Any young 
sibling in HCB 
-0.172 -0.263 -0.131 -0.270 0.0849 -0.151 0.00965 
 (0.242) (0.211) (0.266) (0.288) (0.117) (0.225) (0.117) 
 Pct young 
siblings in HCB 
-0.190 -0.290 -0.144 -0.298 0.0937 -0.166 0.0107 
 (0.263) (0.233) (0.290) (0.325) (0.134) (0.241) (0.130) 
 
         Nobs 1,405 1,405 1,405 1,405 1,405 1,405 1,405 
 

















Table 30 Effect of HCB on older brothers’ education and time use 
 
Panel B. Effect on Time Use 
 





















sibling in HCB 
0.216 -0.0462 0.0100 0.00821 0.0236 0.0251 0.0319 -0.167 
(0.230) (0.144) (0.0386) (0.0584) (0.0627) (0.106) (0.0563) (0.120) 
Pct young 
siblings in HCB 
0.254 -0.131 0.00623 0.0263 0.00808 0.0194 0.0452 -0.160 




sibling in HCB 
0.220 0.178 0.492 -0.375 -0.110 -0.946 -0.225 0.211 
(1.373) (1.716) (0.472) (0.593) (0.413) (0.743) (0.382) (1.149) 
Pct young 
siblings in HCB 
0.242 0.196 0.543 -0.414 -0.128 -1.099 -0.262 0.245 
(1.522) (1.897) (0.515) (0.675) (0.486) (0.873) (0.453) (1.346) 
    
  
    Nobs 1,405 1,405 1,405 1,405 1,123 1,123 1,123 1,123 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. The units for time to HCB are minutes divided by 100. The 
regressions include child and household characteristics such as child’s age and gender, the mother’s and the head of the household’s age and 
gender, and indicators for the composition of the household (number of persons 0-5 years old, 6-10,11-15, 16-17, 18-39, 40-59 and 60 years old 
or more). A household wealth index is also included, constructed based on the household’s assets and appliances information. Municipality 
characteristics include having a hospital in town, percentage of households with pipe water and percentage with sewage connection. I also 
control for household location variables, such as living in the center of the town and time to the health center, the school and the town hall. 








N. hours work 
per week  
Nmonths 
work last 12 
months  
N. hours work 
per week  
Nmonths 
work last 12 
months  
  (Unconditional on working) (Conditional on working) 






0.266*** 8.933*** 2.765*** -2.015 0.0664 




0.286*** 10.88*** 2.930*** 0.993 0.0614 
(0.0702) (3.474) (0.945) (2.676) (0.815) 






0.851** 41.16** 9.313** 29.59* 2.461 




0.976** 47.21** 10.69** 32.04* 2.659 
(0.448) (19.34) (5.180) (17.20) (3.119) 
      Nobs 2,047 2,027 2,043 734 748 
      
 
Any young 
child in  HCB 
Percentage 
young 
children in  
HCB 
   First stage-
Fstat 
6.37 6.12 
   
      Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. The units for time to 
HCB are minutes divided by 100. The regressions include child and household characteristics such as 
child’s age and gender, the mother’s and the head of the household’s age and gender, and indicators 
for the composition of the household (number of persons 0-5 years old, 6-10,11-15, 16-17, 18-39, 40-
59 and 60 years old or more). A household wealth index is also included, constructed based on the 
household’s assets and appliances information. Municipality characteristics include having a hospital 
in town, percentage of households with pipe water and percentage with sewage connection. I also 
control for household location variables, such as living in the center of the town and time to the 
health center, the school and the town hall. Other variables include department (state) fixed effects 





Figure 14 Age distribution of the sample 
 





Figure 16 Time to HCB, by participation and gender 
 




Figure 18 Participation in HCB vs. municipality poverty 
 
  
